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1.  Introduction 
The recent COVID-191 pandemic2 has been characterized as “humanities darkest 
hour”, at least since World War II.3 In light of its unprecedented effects on the global 
economy, it has led to the revival of two classical concepts of international contract 
law: force majeure and hardship.4 Both concepts provide legal tools to deal with the 
effect of unexpected future events and unforeseen changes in circumstances, partic-
ularly in long-term contracts.5 Given its global and unprecedented dimensions, its lethal 
potential and its drastic effects on international contracts, whether long-term or not, the 
COVID-19 pandemic will generate years, if not decades, of post-pandemic litigation 
and arbitration focusing on the application of these two concepts. This trend was fore-
shadowed by governments and public authorities when, early during the pandemic, 
they acknowledged the crisis as a global force majeure event. On February 10, 2020, 
a spokesperson for the PRC’s Legislative Affairs Commission of the National People's 
Congress Standing Committee (全国人大常委会法工委) announced that measures 
which were implemented by the Chinese government to combat the virus and which 
interfere with contracts should be considered force majeure events.6 In line with this 
statement, the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), a 
quasi-governmental body, had issued a record number of 6.454 force majeure 
 
1 COVID-19, an abbreviation for „Coronavirus disease 2019“, is an infectious disease caused by severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), see Origin of SARS-CoV-2 (March 26, 2020) 
https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus/who-recommendations-to-reduce-risk-of-transmission-
of-emerging-pathogens-from-animals-to-humans-in-live-animal-markets (accessed April 20, 2020). 
2 COVID-19 was declared as a pandemic by the Director-General of the World Health Organization 
(WHO), Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, on 11 March 2020 due to the rapid increase in the number 
of cases outside China since the end of February 2020 that affected a growing number of countries, see 
WHO announces COVID-19 outbreak a pandemic, http://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-
emergencies/coronavirus-covid-19/news/news/2020/3/who-announces-covid-19-outbreak-a-pandemic 
(accessed April 20, 2020).  
3 Statement of the IMF’s managing director, Kristalina Georgieva, during a WHO press briefing on 
April 3rd 2020, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/04/03/tr040320-transcript-kristalina-
georgieva-participation-world-health-organization-press-briefing (accessed April 20, 2020). 
4 See, e.g., for German law Marc-Philippe Weller, et al., Virulente Leistungsstörungen - Auswirkungen 
der Corona-Krise auf die Vertragsdurchführung, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2020, 1017, 
1022. 
5 See generally PASCALE ACCAOUI LORFING, LA RENÉGOCIATION DES CONTRATS INTERNATIONAUX 28 et seq. 
(Bruylant 2011); see for the increased significance of the time element in international contract law Attila 
Harmathy, Hardship, in EPPUR SI MUOVE: THE AGE OF UNIFORM LAW — ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF MICHAEL 
JOACHIM BONELL TO CELEBRATE HIS 70TH BIRTHDAY Vol. II, 1039 (International Institute for the Unification 
of Private Law ed., Unidroit 2016). 
6 A force to be reckoned with-Chinese firms use obscure legal tactics to stem virus losses, The virus 
has led to firms trying to get out of contracts, https://www.economist.com/business/2020/02/20/chinese-
firms-use-obscure-legal-tactics-to-stem-virus-losses (accessed April 20, 2020). 
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certificates to Chinese companies until March 25, 2020.7 They covered a total contract 
value of about 89.4 billion USD and were intended to exempt local exporters from ful-
filling contracts with overseas parties by proving that non-performance of their con-
tracts was due to COVID-19 related measures like holiday extensions or lockdowns.8 
On February 28, 2020, the French Ministry of Economy stated that the COVID-19 pan-
demic will be considered as a force majeure event and that penalties for late deliveries 
will not be applied in public procurement contracts.9 Similar declarations were made 
by other governments.10 
Analogies between the COVID-19 pandemic and that of a natural disaster – a classical 
force majeure scenario11 – can be made, making the initial focus of the debate exclu-
sively on the force majeure doctrine understandable. However, in certain jurisdictions 
both force majeure and hardship doctrines – or force majeure and hardship clauses in 
the contracts themselves12 – may be available and capable of excusing or modifying 
performance in circumstances such as the COVID-19 pandemic.13 It is therefore im-
portant to understand the relationship between these two doctrines, which – in these 
and other unforeseen events – can be a difficult task given that they are the products 
of various national legal traditions and have developed along different paths in different 
ways.14  
 
7 CCPIT Guides Enterprises to Leverage Force Majeure Certificates, which Help to Maintain Nearly 60% 
Contracts, http://en.ccpit.org/info/info_40288117668b3d9b017163990e5a082a.html (accessed April 20, 
2020). 
8 Id.; backed by the CCPIT certificates, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) and the 
China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) issued force majeure notices to its customers, K. Christie, M 
Han, and L Shmatenko (2020 forthcoming), LNG Contract Adjustments in Difficult Times: The Interplay 
between Force Majeure, Change of Circumstances, Hardship, and Price Review Clauses, OGEL March 
2020, 1, 12. 
9 The original text of the declaration can be found here: https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/273763-
bruno-le-maire-28022020-coronavirus (accessed April 20, 2020). The declaration was later listed 
among the government’s measures for assisting businesses during the epidemic: https://www.econo-
mie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/mesures-daccompagnement-des-entreprises-impactees-par-le-coronavirus-covid-
19 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
10 The Iraqi government issued a similar declaration, qualifying the period of the COVID-19 crisis a force 
majeure event for all projects and contracts effective from February 20, 2020, https://gds.gov.iq/iraqs-
crisis-cell-extends-curfew-announces-additional-measures-to-contain-covid-19/ (accessed April 20, 
2020); the declaration affected projects worth approximately 291 billion USD, https://www.offshore-tech-
nology.com/comment/iraq-covid-19-force-majeure-contracts/ (accessed April 20, 2020). 
11 See infra Section 2.1. 
12 See infra Section 4.3. 
13 See Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1021; Julia Heinich, L'incidence de l'épidémie de coronavirus sur 
les contrats d'affaires: de la force majeure à l'imprévision, RECUEIL DALLOZ 2020, 611. 
14 See, e.g., Thomas Rüfner, in COMMENTARIES ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAWS Art. 8:108 § 2 (Nils Jansen 
& Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Oxford University Press 2018) on excuse of non-performance in Euro-
pean legal systems: “The pertinent rules in the various European legal systems tend to be very different 
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Given the different and often confusing historical trajectories of these two doctrines, 
this article aims at providing a comprehensive assessment of the force majeure and 
hardship doctrines as they operate today, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic as 
well as in other constellations. After situating these doctrines within their dogmatic and 
historic15 origins, the article seeks to provide an explanation for the differences be-
tween and among these two doctrines in various national jurisdictions and at the trans-
national level.  
2. Pacta sunt servanda versus clausula rebus sic stantibus: The eternal conflict 
between stability and flexibility of contractual relations 
2.1. Examples from Commercial Practice 
Apart from the COVID-19 pandemic there are myriads of examples of changed circum-
stances in international business life. They relate to situations where the initial condi-
tions or circumstances contemplated by the parties to a long-term contract change 
subsequently. These changes of circumstances can be of any conceivable character, 
whether commercial, technical, political, environmental or of any other known or un-
known quality:16 
 
from one country to the next; their history is complicated and the state of the law is confusing in many 
systems”; Sukhnam Digwa-Singh, The Application of Commcercial Impracticability under Article 2-615 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 305, 329 (Ewan 
McKendrick ed., Lloyd's of London Press 2nd ed. 1995); Werner Melis, Force majeure and Hardship 
Clauses in International Commercial Contracts in View of the Practice of the ICC Court of Arbitration, 1 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 212, 215-216 (1984). 
15 See for the benefit of legal history as a tool for the further development of international business law, 
e.g. in the area of international arbitration BJÖRN CENTNER, IURA NOVIT CURIA IN INTERNATIONALEN 
SCHIEDSVERFAHREN, EINE HISTORISCH-RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE STUDIE ZU DEN GRUNDLAGEN DER 
RECHTSERMITTLUNG (Mohr 2019) 334: “The experiences of legal history show the way to the future.” 
(translation by the authors); see for a similar approach in the context of transnational business law („New 
Lex Mercatoria“) KLAUS PETER BERGER, The Lex Mercatoria (Old and New) and the TransLex-Principles, 
https://www.trans-lex.org/the-lex-mercatoria-and-the-translex-principles_ID8, para. 2 (accessed April 
20, 2020); see generally for the value of legal history for the development of modern law: Friedrich Carl 
von Savigny, Ueber den Zweck dieser Zeitschrift, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTLICHE RECHTSWISSEN-
SCHAFT 1815, 1, 4: „[Legal] history is not just a collection of examples [from the past], but the only way 
to arrive at a true insight into our current state of [lega] affairs“ (translation by the authors). 
16 See the collection of cases in PIET ABAS, REBUS SIC STANTIBUS: EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ZUR ANWENDUNG 
DER CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS IN DER RECHTSPRECHUNG EINIGER EUROPÄISCHER LÄNDER 285 et seq. 
(1993); Christoph Brunner, Rules on Force Majeure as Illustrated in Recent Case Law, in HARDSHIP AND 
FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 82 (Fabio Bortolotti & Dorothy Ufot eds., ICC 
2018). 
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− a substantial devaluation of the contract currency17 or dramatic fall in the price 
for a sold product;18 
− the refusal of a central bank to grant a permit for payments in the currency due 
under a contract;19  
− a regional (such as in South East Asia in 1997) or global financial crisis (such as 
in 2008/09) causing extreme economic burdens for a party to a contract;20  
− a long-term gas or Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) supply contract concluded 25 
years ago in which the gas price formula is linked to the oil price index, and the 
much lower current gas prices on the spot markets make the contract wholly un-
profitable for the buyer;21 
− civil riots, other hostilities or natural catastrophes that prevent the performance of 
construction works at a site in a distant country (for example for a road or other 
infrastructure project);22  
− detection of a large number of submerged explosives which require removal by 
a specialized firm at the bottom of a harbor which had been heavily bombarded 
during a war;23 
− hurricanes or typhoons that destroy off-shore facilities for sub-sea gas or oil ex-
ploitation or an off-shore wind-park; 
− an unprecedented drought that results in the suspension of the operation of a 
plant for the production of tungsten;24 
− cancellation of an export license for the export of raw materials which constitutes 
the subject of a long-term delivery contract;25  
 
17 See, e.g., for Turkey: Ecem Susoy Uygun, Adapting Bilateral Agreements based on Natural Gas in 
the Electricity Market, Erdem & Erdem Newsletter (Sep. 2018) http://www.erdem-erdem.av.tr/publica-
tions/newsletter/adapting-bilateral-agreements-based-on-natural-gas-in-the-electricity-market/ (ac-
cessed April 20, 2020). 
18 ICC Case No. 8486 of 1996, 24 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 162, 168 (1999). 
19 ICC Case No. 3099/3100 of 1979, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 67, 70 (Sigvard Jarvin 
& Yves Derains eds. 1990); ICC Case No. 3093/3100 of 1979, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-
1985 365 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds. 1990). 
20 Tandrin Aviation Holdings Ltd. v. Aero Toy Store LLC [2010] EWCH 40 (Comm.); Brunner, supra note 
16, at 91; see also WOLFGANG WIEGAND, DIE FINANZMARKTKRISE UND DIE CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS 
DARGESTELLT AM BEISPIEL DER BONUSZAHLUNGEN, Jusletter.ch of February 9, 2009 (https://jusletter.web-
law.ch/juslissues/2009/509.html) (accessed April 20, 2020), stating that the world financial crisis fulfils 
the requirements of clausula rebus sic stantibus (the Swiss hardship doctrine) “in a textbook form”. 
21 PIETRO FERRARIO, THE ADAPTATION OF LONG-TERM GAS SALE AGREEMENTS BY ARBITRATORS 26 (Wolters 
Kluwer 2017). 
22 Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 147, 152-153 (1983): 
“[S]trikes, riots and other civil strife in the course of the Islamic Revolution had created classic force 
majeure conditions at least in Iran’s major cities. By ‘force majeure’ we mean social and economic forces 
beyond the power of the state to control through the exercise of due diligence. Injuries caused by the 
operation at such forces are therefore not attributable to the state for purposes of its responding for 
damages”. 
23 ICC Case No. 2763 of 1980, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 157, 158 et seq. (Sigvard 
Jarvin & Yves Derains eds. 1990). 
24 Global Tungsten & Powders Corp. v. Largo Resources Ltd. (ICC Case No. 19566 of 2014), Arbitrator 
Intelligence Materials; see also ICC Case No. 8790 of 2000, 29 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 13, 20 (2004); 
Mercédeh Azeredo da Silveira, Economic Sanctions, Force Majeure and Hardship, in HARDSHIP AND 
FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 161 (Fabio Bortolotti & Dorothy Ufot eds., 
ICC 2018). 
25 ICC Case No. 2478 of 1974, 3 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 222 (1978). 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575869
6 
 
− extremely high demurrage payments caused by the fact that a ship is detained 
by state authorities of the country in which the port is located;26 
− cancellation of an export license by state authorities;27 
− state embargoes or sanctions that have an impact on the parties’ contractual ob-
ligations.28  
In the COVID-19 pandemic as well as in all the scenarios listed above, the parties are 
faced with the eternal dilemma of contract law: the conflict between two ancient and 
fundamental legal maxims, “pacta sunt servanda” on the one hand and “clausula rebus 
sic stantibus” on the other.29 Both maxims were developed by Canonist scholars and 
moral theologians in the Middle Ages under the influence of Roman law and Roman 
philosophy, with reference to the paramount significance of the human will.30 They 
have survived ever since.  
2.2. The Pacta Principle 
The pacta principle stands for the sanctity and stability of contractual relations. The 
principle forms the “hallowed basis”31 of classical contract theory. That theory regards 
a contract as a deal: a discrete transaction in the form of a mutual promise that must 
 
26 Great Elephant Corp. v. Trafigura Beheer BV (The Crudersky) [2013] EWCA Civ 905; Brunner, supra 
note 16, at 86 et seq. 
27 ICC Case No. 2478 of 1974, 3 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 222, 223 (1978). 
28 ICC Case No. 7575 of 2002, 137 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 1378, 1380 (2010), excerpts 
available at: www.trans-lex.org/207575 (accessed April 20, 2020); Starrett Housing Corp. v. Iran, 16 
Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 112 (1987); Mobile Oil Iran v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 38 (1987), 
excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/232000 (accessed April 20, 2020); Nordic American Shipping 
A/S Owner v. Bayoil USA Inc. Charterer, Final Award of April 26, 1993, 20 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 126, 130 
(1995) (Society of Maritime Arbitrators), excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/250300 (accessed 
April 20, 2020); Brauer & Co (Great Britain) Ltd. v. James Clark (Brush Materials) Ltd, [1952] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 147, 151 (CA) (Eng.), excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/308700 (accessed April 20, 2020).  
29 CHRISTOPH BRUNNER, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP UNDER GENERAL CONTRACT PRINCIPLES: 
EXEMPTION FOR NON-PERFORMANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1-3 (Kluwer Law International 2009); 
Berthold Goldman, The applicable law: general principles of law — the lex mercatoria, in Contemporary 
Problems in International Arbitration 113, 125 (Julian Lew ed., 1987); see for long-term gas and LNG 
sales agreements Paul Griffin, English law in the global LNG business: international LNG sale and 
purchase—a relational arrangement, 12 The Journal of World Energy Law & Business 216, 223 (2019). 
30 See for the pacta principle: DAVID HUGHES PARRY, THE SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH LAW 5 et 
seq. (Stevens 1959); for the clausula principle see Leopold Pfaff, Die clausel Rebus sic stantibus in der 
Doctrin und der österreichischen Gesetzgebung, in FESTSCHRIFT ZUM SIEBZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAGE SEINER 
EXCELLENZ DR. JOSEPH UNGER 221, 223 et seq. (Universität Wien: Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche 
Fakultät ed., 1898); RALF KÖBLER, DIE „CLAUSULA REBUS SIC STANTIBUS“ ALS ALLGEMEINER 
RECHTSGRUNDSATZ 27 et seq. (1991); Abas, supra note 16, at 7 et seq.; Robert Feenstra, Impossibilitas 
and clausula rebus sic stantibus, in FATA IURIS ROMANI: ÉTUDES D'HISTOIRE DU DROIT 364, 368 et seq 
(Robert Feenstra ed., Presse universitaire de Leyde 1974); Pascal Pichonnaz, From clausula rebus sic 
stantibus to hardship, 17 FUNDAMINA: A JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY 125 (2011); REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, 
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 581 (Juta & Co 1990). 
31 Zimmermann, supra note 30, at 577. 
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be kept.32 Each party is entitled to rely on the performance of obligations undertaken 
by the other side: “my word is my bond”.33 In the age of liberalism, the pacta principle 
– and the idea that only parties in privity of contract with one another were entitled to 
determine the “just price” (“pretium justum”) for their transaction – required contracts 
to be enforced in such an absolute manner that any revision of a contract by a third 
party was out of question.34 Today, the pacta principle constitutes the cardinal principle 
of most national contract laws.35 For that reason, it is also one of the foundation stones 
of a civilized society36 and an “indisputable rule of international law”37 as well. Ulti-
mately, it is the autonomy of the parties which provides the moral force behind the 
contract as a binding promise.38 Consequently, the influence of unforeseen and 
changed circumstances on the contract tends to be best dealt with when the parties 
 
32 CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION 117 (Oxford University 
Press 2nd ed. 2015): “Bargains are struck and their prices evaluated on the assumption that they will 
be kept.” 
33 See for this ethical commitment to the given word id., at 16: “The obligation to keep a promise is 
grounded not in arguments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust”: see also RUDOLF 
VON JHERING, DER ZWECK IM RECHT Vol. I, 206 et seq. (Breitkopf & Härtel 1923); FRANZ BYDLINSKI, 
PRIVATAUTONOMIE UND OBJEKTIVE GRUNDLAGEN DES VERPFLICHTENDEN RECHTSGESCHÄFTES 109 (Springer 
1967); George Gardner, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Law of Contracts, 46 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1932); 
Matthias Storme, The Validity and the Content of Contracts, in TOWARDS A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE 159, 
184 (Arthur Hartkamp, et al. eds., Ars Aequi Libri 1994). 
34 Ahmet Yıldırım, Equilibrium in International Commercial Contracts: With Particular Regard to Gross 
Disparity and Hardship Provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
21 (Wolf Legal Publishers 2011); see also Catherine Pédamon & Jason Chuah, Hardship in 
Transnational Commercial Contracts: A Critique of the Legal, Judicial and Contractual Remedies 32 
(Paris Legal Publ. 2013): “Any (judicial) revision is sacrificed on the altar of the sanctity of contract.” 
35 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co (TOPCO) v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 
January 19, 1974, 53 Int’l Law Rep. 389, 462 (1979) (Ad Hoc); MARC-PHILIPPE WELLER, DIE 
VERTRAGSTREUE: VERTRAGSBINDUNG - NATURALERFÜLLUNGSGRUNDSATZ - LEISTUNGSTREUE 27 (Mohr 
Siebeck 2009); Helmut Köhler, Vertragsrecht und „Property Rights“-Theorie, 144 ZHR 589, 592 (1980).  
36 See from the perspective of natural law SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, DE IURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM Vol. III, 
Ch. 4 para. 2 (Kennett Lichfield trans., Knochius et Filius 1703): “[A] most sacred command of the law 
of nature and what guides and governs not only the whole method and order but the whole grace and 
ornament of human life, that every man keeps his faith, or which amounts to the same that he fulfils his 
contracts, and discharges his promises”. 
37 Bin Cheng, General Principles Of Law as applied by International Courts And Tribunals 113 
(Burlington Press Paperback re-issue ed. 1987); Charles Kotuby & Luke Sobota, General Principles of 
Law and International Due Process 89 et seq. (Oxford University Press 2017); Hans Wehberg, Pacta 
Sunt Servanda, 53 Am. J. Int'l. L. 775, 786 (1959). 
38 Fried, supra note 32, at 57; see also HUGO GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE: INCLUDING THE 
LAW OF NATURE AND OF NATIONS, Vol. I, 12 (Rev. Campbell A.M trans., 1814), who emphasized personal 
liberty (“private autonomy”) as a fundamental “private right . . . established for the advantage of each 
individual”; Norbert Horn, Person und Kontinuität, Versprechen und Vertrauen: Die Perspektive des 
Zivilrechts, in NORBERT HORN, GESAMMELTE SCHRIFTEN 1199, 1202 et seq. and 1219 et seq. (Harald 
Herrmann & Klaus Peter Berger eds., De Gruyter 2016): “freedom and self-responsibility are linked 
through the legally binding nature of the declaration of will”. 
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themselves have taken precautions at the drafting stage: “to contract means to fore-
see” (“contrater, c’est prévoir”39).  
2.3. The Clausula Principle 
The clausula principle favors a flexible reaction to scenarios such as the ones de-
scribed in Section 2.1 above. In these situations, the binding force of a contract may 
turn into fetters.40 The clausula principle allows the parties to free themselves from the 
strict application of the pacta principle. It is based on the idea that the continued en-
forceability and performance of a contract is always subject to the continued existence 
of those circumstances which existed at the time of contracting and which formed the 
basis for the parties’ bargain. Two of the most famous scholars of the Middle Ages, the 
Italian jurists Baldus and Bartolus regarded this as an implied condition in any obliga-
tion (“rebus sic se habentibus”).41 According to them, there is a “rule that every promise 
is to be understood with the circumstances being the same”.42 This notion would con-
tinue to play an important role as a recurring theme in the historic evolution of the 
clausula principle.43 Such a premise would create a “crisis of contract” in the late eight-
eenth century by calling into question the binding force of contracts.44 For others, the 
clausula principle was not a threat to the pacta principle. Properly understood, that 
principle relates to the “inviolability, but not the unchangeability of contracts”.45 This 
understanding of the pacta principle is derived from equity and good faith (“pacta sunt 
servanda bona fide”).46 Good faith, as a standard of contractual behavior, requires a 
 
39 GEORGES RIPERT, LA RÈGLE MORALE DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 151 (LGDJ-Lextenso 2014); see 
also Accaoui Lorfing, supra note 5, at 29. 
40 See Köbler, supra note 30, at 275. 
41 Zimmermann, supra note 30, at 580. 
42 Andreas Thier, Legal history, in UNEXPECTED CIRCUMSTANCES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 18 
(Christoph Grigoleit & Ewoud Hondius eds., Cambridge University Press 2011). 
43 See infra Section 5.2.2. 
44 See, e.g., Robert Hillman, Crisis in Modern Contract Theory Essay, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103 (1988); 
CHRISTOPHE JAMIN & DENIS MAZEAUD, LA NOUVELLE CRISE DU CONTRAT (Dalloz 2012); see also Zimmer-
mann, supra note 30, at 579: “One of the most interesting, and potentially most dangerous, inroads into 
pacta sunt servanda has, however, been the so-called clausula rebus sic stantibus: a contract is binding 
only as long and as far as (literally:) matters remain the same as they were at the time of conclusion of 
the contract. It is obvious that such a proviso, if broadly interpreted, can be used to erode the binding 
nature of contractual promises very substantially; not surprisingly, therefore, the clausula doctrine fell 
into oblivion in the late 18th and the 19th centuries: the heyday of ‘classical’ contractual doctrine when 
freedom of contract, economic liberalism and certainty of law reigned supreme.” 
45 Hasan Zakariya, Changed Circumstances and the Continued Validity of Mineral Development 
Contracts, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 263, 275 (Kamal Hossain 
ed., Bloomsbury Academic 2013). 
46 See Tobias Lutzi, Introducing Imprévision into French Contract Law - A Paradigm Shift in Comparative 
Perspective, in THE FRENCH CONTRACT LAW REFORM: A SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? 89, 91 (Sanne Jansen 
& Sophie Stijns eds., Intersentia 2016): exceptions to the pacta principle as “concessions to contractual 
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party not to enrich itself at the expense of the other in scenarios of unforeseen and 
changed circumstances and to cooperate with the other side when such events arise. 
In this way, good faith can set limits to or inform the pacta principle47 by providing a 
legal and moral justification against the conception of the pacta principle as an absolute 
one.  
Thus understood, application of the clausula principle emphasizes the relational na-
ture48 of long-term contracts. These contracts derive their legitimacy not only from the 
parties’ will, but also from their relationship. That relationship is placed in a context: the 
industry, the parties’ prior business dealings, the nature and subject matter of the con-
tract, etc. In commercial reality, that context is usually in a constant state of change or 
flux.49 To take account of these changes, the contractual bargain is based not only on 
the parties’ explicit consent, but also on implicit terms, conditions or understandings 
which relate to the change or non-change of that context. The contract is regarded as 
a “living organism” whose program of contractual right and duties of the parties is flex-
ible to accommodate their legitimate expectations.50  
2.4 The Need to Strike a Balance 
Determining which of these two principles prevails in a given case of changed circum-
stances depends on the strength of the pacta principle in the relevant jurisdiction and 
 
fairness.” 
47 ICC Case No. 4761 of 1987, 114 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 1012, 1015 (1987), excerpts 
available at: www.trans-lex.org/204761 (accessed April 20, 2020); see also ICC Case No. 5953 of 1989, 
117 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 1056, 1061 (1990), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/205953 (accessed April 20, 2020): “Another principle, albeit with a reduced degree of generality 
because it only concerns the execution of contracts, is formulated by the maxim ‘pacta sunt servanda’. 
The respect for this rule requires parties to execute their contractual undertakings. However, the modal-
ities of [the parties’ execution of their contractual undertakings] are not indicated [by this general rule]. 
It is the preceding principle [of good faith] which provides this precision in a way that one can merge 
both principles into one when it comes to the performance of a contractual obligation: ‘pacta sunt 
servanda bona fide’”; see also Accaoui Lorfing, supra note 5, at 110; Horn, supra note 38, at 1204 (long-
term contract as a “cooperation program”); see generally Kotuby & Sobota, supra note 37, at 91 et seq. 
48 See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW 55, 55 (1963); IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO 
MODERN CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (Yale University Press 1980); Ian Macneil, Contracting Worlds and 
Essential Contract Theory, 9 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES 431 (2016). 
49 NAGLA NASSAR, SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS REVISITED: A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF LONG-
TERM INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 21 (Martinus Nijhoff 1994); see also Accaoui Lorfing, 
supra note 5, at 29 and 33 et seq., who refers to the standard of “tolérance contractuelle”, i.e. the be-
haviour and state of mind that can be expected from reasonable contract parties, which may, in the 
presence of changed circumstances, lead to a mode of contract performance which is “reasonably dif-
ferent” from the one agreed upon in the contract. 
50 Pédamon & Chuah, supra note 34, at 36. 
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the willingness of courts, doctrine and parties51 alike to accept equitable exceptions to 
the rule, especially in in highly extraordinary situations such as those caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic. In international or transnational contract law, equitable excep-
tions from the pacta principle in the form of the various force majeure and hardship 
doctrines have long since been accepted.52 To varying degrees, both doctrines have 
become disconnected from the diverse pattern of national legal systems and become 
part of transnational contract law.53 
3. Confusion between the force majeure and hardship doctrines 
In both practice and theory, the doctrines of force majeure and hardship are sometimes 
not properly distinguished.54 There are many reasons for this confusion, which are to 
be found at all levels of the analysis of these two doctrines. 
From a practical perspective, there is a distinction between force majeure and hardship 
doctrines and force majeure and hardship clauses55 in a contract. For example, the 
doctrines of force majeure and hardship are based on different rationales – one on 
impossibility and the other on changed circumstances – and are distinguishable in 
most cases, while force majeure and hardship clauses in contracts have largely devel-
oped in practice to be understood as rather indistinguishable. Accordingly, when force 
majeure and hardship clauses are both provided for in a contract, their relationship and 
overlap is often unclear because they are so frequently understood to operate in the 
same way.56 This could be explained by the influence of the Anglo-Saxon legal tradition 
 
51 NIGEL BLACKABY & CONSTANTINE PARTASIDES, REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 
9.68 (Oxford University Press 6th ed. 2015) pointing out that the increasing competitive environment of 
international business makes it often difficult for parties to agree on contract adaptation or accept third-
party intervention “[E]specially . . . when one party stands to make a substantial financial gain by holding 
the other party to an unambiguous contractual commitment. The concept of fairness sometimes appears 
to take second place behind the prospect of profit”. 
52 David Rivkin, Lex Mercatoria and Force majeure, in TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 161 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., ICC 1993). 
53 Brunner, supra note 29, at 4 et seq. 
54 See Accaoui Lorfing, supra note 5, at 64 et seq.; ICC Case No. 16369 of 2011, 39 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 
169, 202 (2014): “Commercial practice, in particular in cases where sophisticated legal advice is not 
available or has not been retained, does not always neatly distinguish between the fundamentally dif-
ferent concepts [of force majeure and hardship].” 
55 See infra Section 4.3.  
56 Michael Furmston, Drafting of Force Majeure Clauses: Some General Guidelines, in FORCE MAJEURE 
AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 57, 62 (Ewan McKendrick ed., Lloyd's of London Press 2nd ed. 1995): 
“Perhaps the most important question is the relationship between force majeure and hardship where 
both clauses exist in the same contract. Are the clauses mutually exclusive? If not, in which order should 
they be applied? At present, there are no clear answers to these difficult questions”; Philippe Kahn, “Lex 
mercatoria” et pratique des contrats internationaux, in LE CONTRAT ÉCONOMIQUE INTERNATIONAL 200, 
205 (Bruylant 1975). 
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in international contracting, where there is no distinction understood between a force 
majeure and hardship clause in a contract.57 Also, both force majeure and hardship 
clauses are similar in their purpose: to provide excuse when unforeseen scenarios 
interrupt performance under a contract.  
An example where confusion still persists between the doctrines is in the UN Conven-
tion on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG). The proponents of the 
theory of the “last limit of economic sacrifice”58 under Art. 79 CISG submit that in ex-
treme cases of insurmountable economic impediments – a typical hardship scenario – 
a party must be excused from performance under the force majeure provision of 
Art. 79 CISG, provided that party is faced with “genuinely unexpected and radically 
changed circumstances in truly exceptional cases”.59 Hence, the requirement for ex-
cusing performance under force majeure is conflated with that of hardship. Similarly, 
the drafters of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 
(UPICC) argue that “there may be factual situations which can at the same time be 
considered as cases of hardship and of force majeure”.60 For that reason, it is argued 
 
57 Yildirim, supra note 34, at 89. Neither force majeure nor hardship are recognized doctrines in English 
law. However, contractual force majeure and hardship clauses are understood and applied by the Eng-
lish courts. It is likely that any failure to distinguish between the two clauses is attributable to their ab-
sence as doctrines at law. 
58 KLAUS PETER BERGER, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: NEGOTIATION, 
MEDIATION, ARBITRATION Vol. II, para. 24-65 (Kluwer Law International 3rd ed. 2015); Brunner, supra note 
16, at 90; Brunner, supra note 29, at 213: “The prevailing view by now accepts that the force majeure 
excuse as reflected in Art. 79 CISG not only applies to cases of physical or factual impossibility, but also 
to situations where performance has become excessively onerous (but not merely more onerous) for 
the obligor”; Ingeborg Schwenzer, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE 
OF GOODS (CISG) Art. 79, para. 321 (Peter Schlechtriem & Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., C.H. Beck, Oxford 
University Press 4th ed. 2016); Hof van Cassatie [Cass.] [Court of Cassation], June 19, 2009, Arr. Cas 
2009, 1736 (Belg.), English translation available at: http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090619b1.html 
(accessed April 20, 2020); Marcel Fontaine, The Evolution of the Rules on Hardship, in HARDSHIP AND 
FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 11, at para. 18 (Fabio Bortolotti & Dorothy 
Ufot eds., ICC 2018); Anna Veneziano, UNIDROIT Principles and CISG: Change of Circumstances and 
Duty to Renegotiate according to the Belgian Supreme Court, 15 UNIF. L. REV. 137(2010); ICC Case 
No. 16369 of 2011, 39 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 169 (2014); Ingeborg Schwenzer, Force Majeure and Hardship 
in International Sales Contracts Wider Perspectives, VICTORIA U OF WELLINGTON L. REV. 709 713 (2008): 
“If one were to hold otherwise, unification of the law of sales would be undermined in a very important 
area”; ROLF HERBER & BEATE CZERWENKA, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT: KOMMENTAR ZU DEM 
ÜBEREINKOMMEN DER VEREINTEN NATIONEN VOM 11. APRIL 1980 ÜBER VERTRÄGE ÜBER DEN 
INTERNATIONALEN WARENKAUF Art. 79, para. 8 (C.H. Beck 1991); JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION Art. 79, paras. 432.2 and 442 
(Kluwer 4th ed. 2009); KARL NEUMAYER & CATHERINE MING, CONVENTION DE VIENNE SUR LES CONTRATS 
DE VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE MARCHANDISES Art. 79, para. 14 (Centre du Droit de l'Entreprise 1993). 
59 CISG Advisory Council Opinion No. 7, supra note 89, at para. 37; Brunner, supra note 16, at 90: “a 
very extraordinary deprecation of money occurs or the seller’s delivery, acquisition or production costs 
increase to such an extent that a case of economic impossibility has occurred”. 
60 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, Art. 6.2.2, Comment No. 6 
(UNIDROIT ed., 2017) (emphasis added). 
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that “the concept of hardship may be considered as a particular case of the force 
majeure exemption, although given its distinctive features it is treated as a category of 
its own”.61 A similar situation is also reflected in the mixed (“hybrid”62) jurisdiction of the 
US state of Louisiana. Suggestions have been made there “to expand its law beyond 
the force majeure doctrine into cases of impracticability, imprévision, and hardship [by] 
injecting a good faith analysis into force majeure cases”.63  
4. Force majeure  
Force majeure (“vis major” in Latin) is sometimes translated in English as “Act of God”, 
but literally translates to “superior force”. The force majeure doctrine relates to super-
vening unforeseen events that make performance impossible. It covers cases of sub-
sequent impossibility, i.e. external supervening events occurring after contract for-
mation, that are beyond the control of the aggrieved party such as fires, floods, 
droughts, earthquakes, civil riots, terrorist attacks, etc.,64 which render the perfor-
mance of a party’s contractual obligations not just excessively onerous as in hardship-
type situations,65 but impossible, whether on a temporary or permanent basis.66  
 
61 Brunner, supra note 29, at 392; see also Yildirim, supra note 34, at 89: “hardship is regarded as a 
lower degree of force majeure”. 
62 See generally on the nature and significance of hybrid jurisdictions like Louisiana, Quebec, Scotland, 
Indonesia or the Philippines SUSAN FARRAN, et al., A STUDY OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS ENDANGERED, 
ENTRENCHED OR BLENDED (Ashgate 2014). 
63 Christopher Handy, No Act of God Necessary: Expanding beyond Louisiana's Force Majeure Doctrine 
to Imprevision Comments, 79 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 241, 243, 254 (2018); see for another approach 
Charles Tabor, Dusting Off the Code: Using History to Find Equity in Louisiana Contract Law, 68 LA. L. 
REV. 549, 567 et seq. (2007). 
64 See the non-exhaustive list of force majeure events in TransLex-Principle VI.3 (c), www.trans-
lex.org/944000 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
65 See infra Section 5. 
66 See, e.g., Thames Valley Power Ltd. v. Total Gas & Power Ltd. [2005] EWHC 2208 (Comm.), [2006] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep. 441 [451], excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/307500 (accessed April 20, 2020): 
“The force majeure event has to have caused Total to be unable to carry out its obligations under the 
GSA. Total’s obligation under the GSA is to supply, ie to make physical delivery of, gas in accordance 
with the conditions. These include provisions in respect of a nominated amount of consumption by the 
customer for each of the contract years, and a maximum consumption in any one day. Total is unable 
to carry out that obligation if some event has occurred as a result of which it cannot do that. The fact 
that it is much more expensive, even very greatly more expensive for it to do so, does not mean that it 
cannot do so. To interpret clause 15 as applicable in circumstances where performance is ‘commercially 
impractical’ or Total is ‘commercially unable’ to supply is to enforce a qualification highly uncertain in 
ambit and open ended in reach which is neither necessary nor obvious and which is inconsistent with 
the express terms of the [contract]”; see also Cheng, supra note 37, at 227, quoting the Rumano-Turkish 
Arbitral Tribunal in the case of Michel Macri (1928): “It is axiomatic that force majeure, in order to release 
a person from his obligation, must be of such a nature as to make it impossible for him to fulfil the 
obligation to which he is subject. It does not suffice that the alleged casus fortuitus, without preventing 
the fulfilment of the obligation, merely makes it more onerous”, see also FILALI OSMAN & ÉRIC LOQUIN, 
LES PRINCIPES GÉNÉRAUX DE LA LEX MERCATORIA 162 (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 
1992); Pascale Accaoui Lorfing, L’article 1195 du Code Civil français ou la révision pour imprévision en 
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The COVID-19 pandemic appears as a classical example for such an event. However, 
one needs to first distinguish between the general evaluation of the pandemic from a 
political, socio-economic and health-related standpoint, for example by medical re-
searchers, politicians, governments and public authorities and international organiza-
tions, and the legal qualification of a COVID-19 related situation as a force majeure 
event.  
On 30 January 2020, the Director-General of the World Health Organization (WHO) 
declared that the outbreak of COVID-19 constitutes a “Public Health Emergency of 
International Concern” (PHEIC)67. He advised that “all countries should be prepared 
for containment, including active surveillance, early detection, isolation and case man-
agement, contact tracing and prevention of onward spread of 2019-nCoV infection, 
and to share full data with WHO”.68 This is exactly what happened on a global scale in 
the subsequent months.  
In spite of this global reach and profound impact that the COVID-19 pandemic will have 
on international contacts, the question whether a force majeure event does in fact exist 
in these circumstances remains a legal issue. Once a dispute has arisen between con-
tractual parties, it has to be determined by a court or arbitral tribunal in each individual 
case.69  
Typically, the force majeure event is not the pandemic as such, but the factual or legal 
effects of the public health crisis. Factual effects may involve illness or quarantine or 
even death of key personnel, production facility closures, or interruption of supply 
chains. Legal effects relate to lockdowns, curfews, travel restrictions and other 
 
droit privé français à la lumière du droit comparé, REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES 449, 
450 (2018); Heinich, supra note 13, at 612. 
67 Art. 1 of the 2005 International Health Regulations defines the term PHEIC as “an extraordinary event 
which is determined, as provided in these Regulations:  
i. to constitute a public health risk to other States through the international spread of disease; and 
ii. to potentially require a coordinated international response”. 
68 Statement on the second meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Com-
mittee regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) of 30 January 2020, 
https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-interna-
tional-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-
(2019-ncov) (accessed April 20, 2020). 
69 See Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1021, emphasizing that even though the COVID-19 crisis has the 
“potential for a new textbook example” of force majeure, a case-by-case instead of a sweeping evalua-
tion of the COVID-19 situation is required and no party should be burdened with the Corona risk on a 
systematic basis; Eric Wagner, et al., Auswirkungen von COVID-19 auf Lieferverträge, BETRIEBS-
BERATER 2020 845, 847; see for a similar view in French law Heinich, supra note 13, at 612.  
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measures by governments and public authorities which are issued in reaction to the 
crisis.70  
Neither the declaration of the WHO Director-General of 30 January 2020,71 nor force 
majeure certificates issued by public authorities, like the one issued by the Chinese 
CCPIT,72 in and of themselves, would be tantamount to a legal force majeure determi-
nation.73 The Chinese certificates may be considered as providing an indicative effect 
for the factual existence of force majeure in that country. As such, they may be binding 
for the Chinese court’s interpretation of domestic force majeure provisions in Art. 117 
of the PRC’s Contract Law (中国《合同法)74 and Art. 180 of its General Provisions of 
the Civil Law (民法总则)75 due to the lack of separation of powers between the execu-
tive branch and the judiciary.76 They may not, however, prejudge a domestic court’s or 
 
70 Heinich, supra note 13, at 612; Wagner, et al., supra note 69, at 846; Ludovic Landivaux, Contrats et 
coronavirus: un cas de force majeure ? Ça dépend…, DALLOZ ACTUALITÉ March 20, 2020. 
71 Heinich, supra note 13, at 612; see, e.g., for the qualification of a public decree preventing construction 
activities and making construction work on site impossible as a force majeure event under the FIDIC 
contracts  FIDIC COVID-19 GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM TO USERS OF FIDIC STANDARD FORMS 
OF WORKS CONTRACTFIDIC Guidance Memorandum, 
https://fidic.org/sites/default/files/COVID%2019%20Guidance%20Memorandum%20-%20PDF.pdf, 8: 
“COVID-19 may possibly fit the bill of being a Force Majeure or an Exceptional Event, owing to the local 
authorities/government ban on construction activities. But for such a ban, a Force Majeure/Exceptional 
Event case may still be argued, although the most problematic part of the test appears to be whether a 
Party “could not reasonably have avoided or overcome” the event, as it can be argued that the 
implementation of the relevant health and safety measures may make it possible to overcome the said 
COVID-19 event.” 
72 See supra note 8. 
73 See for acts of public authorities as force majeure events Brunner, supra note 29, at 263 et seq.  
74 “If a contract cannot be fulfilled due to force majeure, the obligations may be exempted in whole or in 
part depending on the impact of the force majeure, unless laws provide otherwise. If the force majeure 
occurs after a delayed fulfillment, the obligations of the party concerned may not be exempted. Force 
majeure as used herein means objective situations which cannot be foreseen, avoided or overcome.” 
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELEC-
TRONIC/52923/108022/F1916937257/CHN52923%20Eng.pdf (accessed April 20, 2020). 
75 “Where the non-performance of civil obligations is caused by a force majeure, no civil liability shall 
arise therefrom, except as otherwise provided for by any law. A force majeure means any objective 
circumstance that is unforeseeable, inevitable, and insurmountable.”, https://pku-
law.com/en_law/c6f2d80ee8c0c709bdfb.html (accessed April 20, 2020); on April 20, 2020, the Supreme 
People's Court of the People's Republic of China issued its "Guiding Opinions of the Supreme People's 
Court on Several Issues Concerning the Legally and Properly Conduct of Proceedings in Civil Cases 
Pertinent to the COVID-19 Epidemic (I)", in which it stressed the need for a strict application of the 
mentioned statutory provisions to COVID-19 scenarios and emphasized that the burden of proof is on 
the party invoking these defenses, http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-226241.html (accessed April 
20, 2020). 
76 128 Countries were surveyed for the 2020 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. Among these, 
China ranks 122 with regards to governmental interference in civil court proceedings, https://world-
justiceproject.org/rule-of-law-index/factors/2020/China/Civil%20Justice/ (accessed April 20, 2020) . 
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international arbitral tribunal’s77 factual evaluation of the COVID-19 situation in a given 
case, if that court or tribunal sits outside China.78  
Both the strict distinction between the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic on the one 
hand and its factual or legal consequences on the other as well as the limited effect of 
declarations, certificates or similar statements by governments or public authorities are 
important to prevent misuse of the force majeure defense. They help to fight a tactic 
sometimes called “price majeure” 79, i.e. attempts to renegotiate an unfavorable con-
tractual bargain without the existence of an actual force majeure scenario under the 
guise of a well-accepted legal principle.   
In the next section, both national and transnational contexts will provide the basis for 
explaining how the force majeure doctrine developed in certain jurisdictions. While the 
term used today originates in the French Civil Code, force majeure is a doctrine which 
appears in almost every jurisdiction in the world in some form and which has also 
emerged in contemporary transnational law and practice. In fact, the use of the term 
force majeure is so prolific that even in the extremely limited jurisdictions where force 
majeure is not recognized as a doctrine incorporated into its contract law (i.e. England 
and Wales), courts are still capable of applying contractual force majeure clauses in 
contracts – and do so with frequency.  
 
77 See for examples of arbitral awards in which international arbitral tribunals had to determine the effects 
of orders and measures of governments or public authorities as force majeure situations  
National Oil Corporation v. Libyan Sun Oil Company (First Award on Force majeure), ICC Case No. 
4462 of 1985, 29 International Legal Materials 565 (1990), excerpts of the First and Final Award are 
also published in 16 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 5 (1991); see Klaus Peter Berger & Olivia Johanna Erdelyi, Force 
Majeure in International Contract Law — A Comment on National Oil Corporation v Sun Oil, in THE 
PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION — ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HANS VAN HOUTTE (Patrick Wautelet ed., Hart 
2012); see also 1. Gujarat State Petroleum Corp. Ltd., 2. Alkor Petro Ltd., 3. Western Drilling Contractors 
Private Ltd. v. 1. Republic of Yemen, 2. The Yemeni Ministry of Oil and Minerals, ICC Case No. 19299 
of 2015, text available at https://www.italaw.com/cases/4209 (accessed April 20, 2020); see for a blend 
of political, economic and natural events ICC Award No. 8873 of 1997, 125 Journal du droit international 
(Clunet) 1017 (1998). 
78 See for the comparable declaration of the French Ministry of Economy of 28 February 2020 supra 
note 9; Heinich, supra note 13, at 612: “…it is not for the government to substitute the judge and to de-
termine for all contracts what can and what cannot be considered a case of force majeure” (translation 
by the authors). 
79 A force to be reckoned with-Chinese firms use obscure legal tactics to stem virus losses, The virus 
has led to firms trying to get out of contracts, https://www.economist.com/business/2020/02/20/chinese-
firms-use-obscure-legal-tactics-to-stem-virus-losses (accessed April 20, 2020). 




The notion of force majeure in its modern formulations – both as a contractual clause 
and as a part of the body of law in numerous jurisdictions – derives from the drafters 
of the French Civil Code (Code Napoléon or Code Civil) of 1804, who included force 
majeure as an excuse to contractual performance.80 For historic reasons and because 
of the idiosyncratic influences of some of the drafters of the Code Napoléon, only part 
of the Roman law doctrine of impossibility and none of the Canon law doctrine of 
changed circumstances were included.81 The drafters of the Code Napoléon borrowed 
almost exclusively from the developed legal doctrines of the Northern Natural school.82 
As such, they surely would have known about the doctrine of changed circumstances 
and the two Roman law rules on impossibility. However, they included only subsequent 
impossibility in the French Civil Code.  
Before the comprehensive reform of its contract law in 2016, Art. 1148 of the French 
Civil Code stated that force majeure exonerates a party from paying damages who had 
not fulfilled an obligation: 
There is no occasion for any damages where a debtor was prevented from 
transferring or from doing that to which he was bound, or did what was forbid-
den to him, by reason of force majeure or of a fortuitous event.83 
While the French Civil Code has always contained a provision on the legal conse-
quences of force majeure, the drafters of the French Civil Code had not felt it necessary 
to provide any definition of force majeure. One may wonder why the country with one 
of the earliest codifications of private law and in whose language the legal principle is 
expressed, waited more than 200 years for a definition of the term. The answer lies in 
the drafting history of the Code Napoléon: it contained only very few definitions. Ac-
cording to one of its principal drafters, Portalis – a lawyer and member of the French 
State Council –, the French Civil Code was supposed to be “pragmatic, rather than 
 
80 James Gordley, Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances, 52 THE AMERICAN 
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 513, 518 (2004). 
81 James Gordley & Arthur Taylor von Mehren, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRIVATE 
LAW READINGS, CASES, MATERIALS 504 (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
82 Id. 
83 Translation by the authors, French original available here: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich-
CodeArticle.do?idArticle=LEGIARTI000006436410&cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070721&date-
Texte=18040217 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
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dogmatic”, allowing neither for an “excessive simplification”, nor for a “casuistic legis-
lative approach”.84  
Over the past two centuries, however, the need for a precise definition arose, but the 
French courts were unable to develop a general definition of force majeure without any 
guidance in the Civil Code.85 It was not until 2016 that the French legislature finally 
ended this state of uncertainty by inserting a new Art. 1218 in the Civil Code which 
contains a precise definition of force majeure: 
In contractual matters, there is force majeure where an event beyond the con-
trol of the debtor, which could not reasonably have been foreseen at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract and whose effects could not be avoided by 
appropriate measures, prevents performance of his obligation by the debtor. 
If the prevention is temporary, performance of the obligation is suspended 
unless the delay which results justifies termination of the contract. If the pre-
vention is permanent, the contract is terminated by operation of law and the 
parties are discharged from their obligations under the conditions provided by 
articles 1351 and 1351-1 [dealing with impossibility of performance].86 
While natural disasters do no automatically qualify as force majeure events under 
French law87 and the French courts are very restrictive in accepting even severe dis-
eases as instances of force majeure,88 non-performance based on the effects89 of ex-
traordinary and systemic events such as the COVID-19 pandemic are considered as 
falling squarely under the force majeure doctrine in French law.90 The consequences 
 
84 Francois Geny, La Technique législative dans la Codification civile moderne, in LE CODE CIVIL (1804-
1904) — LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE Vol. II, 1005 et seq. (Société D’études Législatives ed., Arthur Rousseau 
1904); Walther Hug, Gesetzesflut und Rechtssetzungslehre, in GESETZGEBUNGSTHEORIE, JURISTISCHE 
LOGIK, ZIVIL- UND PROZEßRECHT GEDÄCHTNISSCHRIFT FÜR JÜRGEN RÖDIG 11 (Ulrich Klug, et al. eds., 
Springer 1978). 
85 Morgane Cauvin, Das Leistungsstörungsrecht des französischen Code civil nach der Vertragsrechts-
reform 2016 252 (Jan. 14, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
86 See for an English translation of the new Code Civil provisions: http://www.textes.jus-
tice.gouv.fr/art_pix/THE-LAW-OF-CONTRACT-2-5-16.pdf (accessed April 20, 2020). 
87 Fabrice Leduc, Catastrophe naturelle et force majeure, REVUE GÉNÉRALE DU DROIT DES ASSURANCES 
1997, 409. 
88 Two French court judgements (Basse-Terre, 17 déc. 2018, n° 17/00739 ; Nancy, 22 nov. 2010, n° 
09/00003) have refused to qualify the chikungunya virus on the island Saint-Barthélemy in 2013-2014 
and the dengue fever in Martinique as force majeure due to their relatively mild and non-lethal conse-
quences and local limitation; see also Heinich, supra note 13; the plague and the influenca H1N1 of 
2009 have likewise not been qualified as force majeure events by the French courts, see Paris, 25 sept. 
1996, n° 1996/08159; Besançon, 8 janv. 2014, n° 12/0229. 
89 See supra Section 4. 
90 See, e.g., Pascale Guiomard, La grippe, les épidémies et la force majeure en dix arrêts, DALLOZ AC-
TUALITÉ March 4, 2020. 
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of force majeure depend on whether the impediment is temporary or permanent. In 
case of a temporary impediment, performance of the obligation is suspended unless 
the resulting delay justifies termination of the contract. This may apply in many cases 
regarding the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, for example if the production 
of the sold goods can be resumed after the end of the effects of the pandemic on 
business life, unless the nature of the performance is such that catching up on it at 
later date makes no sense for the buyer.91 In case of a permanent impediment, both 
the obligor and the other party are freed from their obligation to perform (“effet 
libératoire”), unless the aggrieved party has assumed the risk for the force majeure 
event.92 The debtor’s exoneration is provided for in Art. 1221 of the French Civil Code 
for his primary contractual obligation to perform in kind and in Art. 1231(1) for his sec-
ondary duty to pay damages for non-performance.93 Under the pre-2016 law in France, 
the French courts held the view that in the case of a permanent impediment, the con-
tract would not be terminated (“effet résolutoire”) ipso iure, but only through a court 
judgement.94 Art. 1218(2) of the French Civil Code makes it clear that under the new 
2016 law, the contract is terminated by operation of law (“résolution de plein droit”) in 
the case of a permanent impediment.  
4.2. Other domestic jurisdictions: Three different doctrines, one underlying 
rationale 
Looking at other jurisdictions, one can determine three different approaches that are 
variations on force majeure doctrines, but with some hardship-type justifications: “sub-
sequent impossibility”, “frustration” and “impracticability”. While the use of different ter-
minology seems to imply clear-cut dogmatic concepts and boundaries from the hard-
ship doctrine, the reality looks different. The three doctrines examined in the next 
 
91 Heinich, supra note 13, at 613; Landivaux, supra note 70. 
92 Fabrice Gréau, Force Majeure, in REPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL para. 94 (Dallloz 2017); the exception in 
cases of risk assumption is provided for in Art. 1351 Code Civil; pursuant to that provision, the debtor 
may also invoke force majeure if the creditor has previously provided him with a notice to perform. 
93 Pascal Ancel, Impossibilité et force majeure: un éclairage du droit allemand sur le nouveau droit 
français des obligations, in MÉLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR CLAUDE WITZ 25, 33 & 37 et seq. 
(Michel Storck ed., LexisNexis 2018); GAËL CHANTEPIE & MATHIAS LATINA, LE NOUVEAU DROIT DES 
OBLIGATIONS COMMENTAIRE THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE L'ORDRE DU CODE CIVIL para. 677 (Dalloz 2nd ed. 
2018); BERTRAND FAGES (ED.), LE LAMY DROIT DU CONTRAT 2034 – Libération par l’effet de la force 
majeure (Wolters Kluwer 2018); Gréau, supra note 92, para. 87 et seq. 
94 See, e.g., Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ., April 14, 1891, Bull. civ. 
no. 55; Cass. 1e civ., June 2, 1982, Bull. civ. I, No. 205; Cass. 1e civ., Nov. 13, 2014, No. 13-24.633; 
Cass. 1e civ., June 8, 2016, Nr. 15-18.929; PAUL-HENRI ANTONMATTEI, CONTRIBUTION À L'ÉTUDE DE LA 
FORCE MAJEURE para. 234 (Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence 1992). 
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section are attempts at finding solutions to problems in jurisdictions that did not or could 
not recognize certain historical doctrines into their respective legal systems.  
For instance, England and subsequently the US are jurisdictions that have created or 
modified impossibility doctrines so as to provide a means to excuse non-performance 
in situations where performance remains technically possible but would be excessively 
onerous. One of the reasons for this is that common law jurisdictions did not recognize 
the Canon law doctrine of changed circumstances and never developed a hardship 
doctrine. The primary reason for this relates to the incapacity of the common law doc-
trine of consideration to explain why performance should be excused when a change 
in the circumstances existing at the time of contracting has caused the foundation or 
purpose of the obligation to be transformed or destroyed.95  
Thus, the doctrine of impossibility has been used – almost exclusively in jurisdictions 
where no doctrine on changed circumstances emerged (common law jurisdictions and 
France) – to excuse excessively onerous contracts from performance. These attempts 
are theoretically problematic, but they nevertheless persist and continue to confuse: 
Frustration is not the equivalent of force majeure or Unmöglichkeit [impossibility] 
nor is force majeure Unmöglichkeit; even force majeure under Belgian law is not 
force majeure under French law.96 
4.2.1. The impossibility doctrine 
Many of the major jurisdictions of the world recognize some form of an impossibility 
doctrine tracing its roots to Roman law.97 This doctrine was derived from the well-
known legal principle of Roman law that “there is no legal obligation to the impossible” 
(“impossibilium nulla est obligatio”).98 However, excuse from performing the impossible 
 
95 National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. [1981] 1 AC 675 [688] “[T]here will be cases of total 
failure of consideration, where there is no subsequent ‘frustrating’ event. Not every total failure of con-
sideration ends in the contract being frustrated, and the total failure of consideration theory says nothing 
about what constitutes a ‘frustrating’ event.” 
96 Alfons Puelinckx, Frustration, Hardship, Force Majeure, Imprévision, Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage, 
Unmöglichkeit, Changed Circumstances: A Comparative study in English, French, German and 
Japanese Law, 3 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 47 (1986); see also Fried, supra note , at 58, 
criticizing the doctrines of frustration and impossibility by stating that “[t]hough relief is granted in all 
these cases, confusion begins in the dichotomizing and subdichotomizing. I agree with critics of classical 
doctrine like Grant Gilmore, who sees there but a single problem” (footnote omitted).  
97 See OLE LANDO & HUGH BEALE, THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW PART I & II 384 (Kluwer 
Law International Combined and revised ed. 1999) with reference to § 1447 Austrian Civil Code, § 275 
German Civil Code, §§ 1218, 1256 Italian Civil Code and Art. 790 Portuguese Civil Code. 
98 CHRISTIAN WOLLSCHLÄGER, DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER UNMÖGLICHKEITSLEHRE ZUR DOGMENGESCHICHTE DES 
RECHTS DER LEISTUNGSSTÖRUNGEN 7 et seq. (Böhlau 1970). 
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could occur at different times and the Roman law thus had two doctrines on impossi-
bility: initial and subsequent.99 Initial impossibility of performance required an impossi-
ble condition prior to contract formation, while subsequent impossibility required a su-
pervening impossible condition at some point after performance has commenced. 
The Roman law doctrines of initial and subsequent impossibility also considered ex-
cuse differently under each doctrine. For initial impossibility, there is no obligation to 
the impossible: an impossible contract is void. However, the doctrine of subsequent 
impossibility will excuse performance by a party to an obligation that has become im-
possible, only if: a) the party invoking the excuse was not at fault;100 b) the impossibility 
is both objectively (neither the obligor nor anybody else is able to perform) and subjec-
tively (the obligor is unable to perform, but others could perform) impossible to perform; 
and c) impossibility (either physical or legal) is absolute. In sum, modern iterations of 
the doctrine on subsequent impossibility can excuse performance if an unforeseen, 
supervening event completely outside the control of the parties which occurrs after 
contract formation, renders performance impossible for the party (subjective) as well 
as everyone else (objective) and the impossibility cannot be attributed to any kind of 
fault of the obligor, i.e. willful or negligent action or omission causing an impossibility. 
Doctrines on initial and subsequent impossibility are common throughout the world. 
However, there is some variation in the parts recognized: for example, Germany incor-
porated both initial and subsequent impossibility into their Civil Code; England only 
recognized initial impossibility at common law (until providing for subsequent impossi-
bility in the first frustration case – discussed below). France, on the other hand, only 
incorporated subsequent impossibility (as the force majeure doctrine and other related 
French doctrines – discussed above) into the French Civil Code. 
4.2.2.  Frustration  
In England, the common law only recognized initial impossibility. By not recognizing 
subsequent impossibility or a doctrine on changed circumstances, England – like most 
common law jurisdictions,– never developed a hardship doctrine. Instead, the English 
courts would develop a doctrine of frustration, which includes subsequent impossibility, 
 
99 Gordley, supra note 80, at 515. 
100 Modern iterations of the doctrine also require that the party invoking the excuse has not contractually 
assumed the risk for the events that rendered performance impossible. 
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frustration of contract and frustration of purpose. Frustration of contract and frustration 
of purpose will be the focus of this section, which excuses performance where the 
underlying basis or purpose of the contract is altered, destroyed or made useless. Sub-
sequent impossibility is included here because of its recognition in the first frustration 
case, Taylor v. Caldwell.101 
Prior to the mid-1800s in England, the common law did not recognize a doctrine of 
subsequent impossibility. The case of Paradine v. Jane102 stood for the proposition 
that subsequent impossibility is not an excuse. In 1863, the English courts created a 
frustration of contract doctrine that also established a doctrine of subsequent impossi-
bility. In Taylor v. Caldwell,103 the court held that an unforeseen supervening event, not 
the fault of either party, that rendered performance impossible could be excused if an 
implied condition disappeared. According to Blackburn J., the implied condition – 
slightly different than the implied condition discussed in the context of the Canon law 
doctrine of changed circumstances – is that all contracts have a thing that is essential 
to it, and that thing must continue to exist throughout performance.104 If that thing is 
destroyed by no fault of the party seeking the excuse, then that party can be ex-
cused.105 This implied condition would be read into contracts seeking frustration as an 
excuse until relatively recently when the House of Lords abandoned the implied con-
dition as a mere fiction.106 That argument is very similar to the criticism raised in Ger-
many against the introduction of the clausula principle into the German Civil Code.107 
Taylor v. Caldwell established two new doctrines at common law: subsequent impos-
sibility and frustration of contract. According to the holding in that case, a frustration 
 
101 Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B.): Taylor, a performer, had agreed to rent Caldwell’s 
music hall for four days. Just prior to the first concert, the music hall was accidently destroyed by fire.  
102 Paradine v. Jane (1647) 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B.). 
103 “The contract is not to be construed as a positive contract, but as subject to an implied condition that 
the parties shall be excused in case, before breach, performance becomes impossible from the perish-
ing of the thing without default of the contractor.” Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 [312] 
(K.B.); Ewan McKendrick, Discharge by Frustration, in CHITTY ON CONTRACTS Vol. I, No. 23-005 (Hugh 
Beale ed., Sweet and Maxwell, Thompson Reuters 33rd ed. 2018). 
104 Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 [314] (K.B.); see also F.A.Tamplin S.S. Co Ltd. v. Anglo-
Mexican Petroleum Products Co Ltd. [1916] 2 AC 397 [403].  
105 The implied condition in the frustration doctrine is similar to the implied condition first contemplated 
by Bartolus and Baldus in the Middle Ages to justify excuse under the Canon law doctrine of changed 
circumstances, see above Section 2.3. 
106 National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. [1981] AC 675 [687 et seq.]; Denny, Mott and 
Dickinson Ltd. v. James B. Fraser & Co. Ltd. [1944] AC 265 [275]; McKendrick, supra note 103, at Vol I 
para. 23-011. 
107 See infra Section 5.2.2. 
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excuse not only required the destruction of the implied condition, it also required im-
possibility of performance.108 However, later cases demonstrated that the frustration 
excuse could succeed even where performance remained possible, but in extremely 
rare instances. An early example where performance remained technically possible 
were the well-known coronation cases, the most prominent being Krell v. Henry.109 
That case also expanded the frustration doctrine from an excuse requiring the destruc-
tion of the thing essential to the contract (frustration of contract) to also include the 
non-occurrence of the thing essential to the contract (frustration of the contract’s com-
mercial purpose).110  
Following on from the coronation cases, the next significant case on the frustration 
doctrine was Davis Contractors v. Fareham,111 where a stricter standard was estab-
lished requiring that the circumstances must “involve a fundamental or radical change” 
from the original contractual obligation.112 That strict and narrow standard still prevails 
today.113 The supervening event must have significantly changed the nature (not 
merely the expense or onerousness) of the outstanding contractual rights and/or obli-
gations from what the parties could reasonably have contemplated at the time of its 
execution, i.e. “it would be wholly unjust to hold them to the literal sense of its stipula-
tions in the new circumstances”.114 In other words, frustration requires a radical change 
of the obligation itself and not just any radical change in circumstances, 115 The nature 
 
108 “A condition is implied that the impossibility of performance arising from the perishing of the person 
or thing shall excuse the performance.” Taylor v. Caldwell (1863) 122 Eng. Rep. 309 [314] (K.B.). 
109 Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (CA). The defendant agreed to rent an apartment for the purpose of 
viewing the coronation parade of King Edward VII. When the King became ill and the coronation was 
postponed, the defendant refused to pay the rent. The court held that the contract could be discharged 
because “the Coronation procession was the foundation of this contract and that the non-happening of 
it prevented the performance of the contract”, Id. at 751; see also Chandler v. Webster [1904] 1 KB 493; 
Blakeley v. Muller [1903] 2 KB 760; Clark v. Lindsay [1903] 88 LT 198; see also for a detailed discussion 
of these cases from a contemporary perspective Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. v. European Medicines 
Agency [2019] EWHC 335, paras. 35 et seq. and 244 et seq. (Ch).  
110 McKendrick, supra note 103, at Vol I para. 23-033; GUENTER TREITEL, FRUSTRATION AND FORCE 
MAJEURE para. 7-001 (Sweet & Maxwell 3rd ed. 2014). 
111 Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C [1956] AC 696 [728].  
112 McKendrick, supra note 103, at Vol I, para. 23-012; see also Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham 
U.D.C [1956] AC 696 [728]: “[F]rustration occurs whenever the law recognises that without default of 
either party a contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the circum-
stances in which performance is called for would render it a thing radically different from that which was 
undertaken by the contract.”  
113 Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. v. European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335 (Ch), para. 27; see 
also National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. [1981] 1 AC 675 [688]; Edwinton Commercial 
Corporation v. Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage and Towage) Ltd. [2007] EWCA Civ. 547, para. 110 
et seq. 
114 National Carriers Ltd. v. Panalpina (Northern) Ltd. [1981] 1 AC 675 [700]. 
115 McKendrick, supra note 103, at Vol I, para. 23-012; see also ICC Case No. 1512 of 1971, 1 Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 128, 129 (1976).  
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and scope of the obligation must be determined through construction of the contract, 
taking into account its nature and context (the “matrix of facts”), as well as the sur-
rounding circumstances and the parties’ knowledge, foresight, assumption and con-
templation at the moment of contract conclusion, in particular as to the occurrence of 
the vent and the related distribution of contractual risks.116 In failing to meet this ele-
vated standard and refusing to discharge the contract, the court in Davis Contractors 
held that the fact that “there had been an unexpected turn of events, which rendered 
the contract more onerous than had been contemplated, was not a ground for relieving 
the contractors of the obligation which they had undertaken”.117 
The frustration doctrine after Davis Contractors would be unlikely to succeed in the 
vast majority of cases. An exception applies in those rare scenarios in which the obli-
gation undertaken in the contract under the circumstances prevailing at the time of its 
conclusion would, if performed under the changed circumstances, result in a com-
pletely different obligation, and that it would require a performance that was exces-
sively onerous or nearly impossible. In other words, “Non haec in foedera veni. It was 
not this that I promised to do”.118  
As a consequence of requiring a radical change to the obligation – and similar to the 
new French law119 – the frustrated contract is automatically terminated and both parties 
are released from their obligations from the time of the occurrence of the frustrating 
event.120 Sums paid or payable under the contract before termination shall be recov-
erable or cease to be payable.121  
Due to this effect of frustration “to kill the contract” and discharge the parties from fur-
ther liability under it, “the doctrine must not be lightly invoked and must be kept within 
very narrow limits”.122 Thus, nearly all attempts at discharging an allegedly frustrated 
contract have failed in the post-Davis Contractors era. For example, the frustration 
 
116 Edwinton Commercial Corp. v. Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage & Towage) Ltd. [2007] EWCA Civ. 
547; Bunge SA v. Kyla Shipping Co Ltd. [2013] EWCA Civ. 734; McKendrick, supra note 103, at Vol I, 
paras. 23-014 and 23-019.  
117 Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C [1956] AC 696 [728]. 
118 Id. at 729; see also Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. v. European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335 
(Ch), paras. 22 and 28 et seq. 
119 See supra Section 4.1. 
120 Brunner, supra note 29, at 90. 
121 Fibrosa Spolka Akcyjna v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour Ltd. [1943] AC 32; Section 1 (2) Law 
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943; McKendrick, supra note 103, at Vol I, paras. 23-074 et seq. 
122 J Lauritzen A.S. v. Wijsmuller B.V. (The Super Servant Two) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s L. Rep. 1 [8] (CA); 
McKendrick, supra note 103, at Vol I, para. 23-007. 
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excuse will almost never succeed where performance becomes significantly more 
costly;123 or – unlike under the US impracticability doctrine – involves circumstances 
of inflation or currency fluctuations.124  
An example of the English approach to frustration can be found in a series of cases in 
the 1960s regarding the closure of the Suez Canal and dealing with the question 
whether contracts affected by that closure could be discharged.125 “In Tsakiroglou & 
Co Ltd. v. Noblee & Thörl GmbH, the House of Lords held held that while the Canal 
was closed, the alternative route around the Cape of Good Hope was always available 
and even though it would be more costly, it was possible and therefore the frustration 
excuse could not apply.126 They further held that to succeed, there would have to be a 
clear indication in the terms of the contract, expressly or impliedly, that the parties 
contemplated that the impossible method of performance (the Suez Canal) was the 
only method, rather than just a method.127  
The frustration doctrine today looks like an extremely narrow version of a doctrine of 
changed circumstances with its implied condition. However, it is still far away from the 
various formulations of the hardship doctrine developed in many civil law jurisdictions 
around the world. The frustration of contract or frustration of purpose doctrines today 
require a change in circumstance that modifies or destroys the foundation or pur-
pose128 of the contract so as to create a radically different obligation that would render 
performance nearly impossible. An application of the frustration doctrine occurred in 
 
123 Edwinton Commercial Corporation v. Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage and Towage) Ltd. [2007] 
EWCA Civ. 547, para. 111: “… the test of ’radically different’ is important: it tells us that the doctrine is 
not to be lightly invoked; that the mere incidence of expense or delay or onerousness is not sufficient; 
and that there has to be as it were a break in identity between the contract as provided for and contem-
plated and its performance in the new circumstances.” 
124 Brunner, supra note 29, at 92 et seq.; EDWIN PEEL, TREITEL ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT 819 et seq. 
(Sweet & Maxwell 14th ed. 2015); see British Movietone News Ltd. v. London and District Cinemas, 
[1952] AC 166, 185; Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham U.D.C [1956] AC 696 [696]. 
125 Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd. v. Noblee & Thörl GmbH [1962] AC 93; Societe Franco-Tunisienne d'Arme-
ment-Tunis v. Sidermar SpA [1961] 2 QB 278 (Comm); Albert D Gaon & Co v. Societe Interprofes-
sionelle des Oleagineux Fluides Alimentaires [1959] 3 WLR 622 (Comm); Carapanayoti & Co. Ltd. v. E. 
T. Green Ltd. [1958] 3 WLR 390 (QB). 
126 Tsakiroglou & Co Ltd. v. Noblee & Thörl GmbH [1962] AC 93: “[N]othing was proved or found as to 
the nature of the goods or other circumstances which would render the route around the Cape unrea-
sonable or impracticable, and this route was at all times available”. 
127 Digwa-Singh, supra note 14, at 325. 
128 Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. v. European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335 (Ch), para. 29: “Fun-
damentally, when one seeks to describe what a party promised, one does not recite the individual terms 
and conditions, but has regard to something much more elemental, that cannot necessarily be captured 
in the precise terms used by the parties in their contract, but which requires reference to what I will term 
the parties’ ‘common purpose’”. 
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2019 in the case of Canary Wharf v. European Medicines Agency,129 where a lease 
agreement was alleged to be frustrated following Brexit. The lease was determined to 
not be frustrated either on the basis of purpose or of supervening illegality, whereby 
the supervening event, Brexit, did not frustrate the underlying purpose of the contract, 
which was to rent headquarter offices in a European Union Member State. This case 
did not even get close to reaching the high threshold to excuse performance, reinforc-
ing just how seldom a frustration excuse is likely to succeed under English law. In spite 
of this exceptional nature of the frustration excuse, the COVID-19 pandemic might 
qualify as such a case under English law in light of its global reach, systemic conse-
quences for the global economy, and resulting drastic consequences for the perfor-
mance of international and domestic contracts. The courts have held contracts to be 
frustrated because of changes in the law (including exercise of statutory power), su-
pervening illegality, outbreak of war, cancellation of an expected event and abnormal 
delay outside what the parties could have reasonably contemplated at the time of con-
tracting. It is therefore possible to envisage COVID-19 and consequent governmental 
actions as potentially falling within one or more of these categories. In particular, where 
time is of the essence to the performance of the contract, the temporary unavailability 
of stocks or staff may arguably give rise to a frustrating event. Similarly, governmental 
restrictions in response to COVID-19 may render the performance of certain obliga-
tions illegal. This may potentially give rise to a claim of supervening illegality. 
4.2.3. Impracticability  
Where the frustration doctrine developed in England as a mechanism to deal with both 
subsequent impossibility and scenarios where the basis of the contract disappears, the 
US developed a doctrine of commercial impracticability to deal with situations where 
there are changes to the basic assumption upon which the contract was made render-
ing performance impracticable.130 Given the common law reverence of the pacta prin-
ciple, the historic relation between US and English legal systems, and the fact that no 
doctrine of changed circumstances (as based on the clausula principle) emerged in 
either jurisdiction, the impracticability doctrine would develop in the early twentieth cen-
tury in the US as something resembling the English frustration doctrine. However, the 
 
129 Canary Wharf (BP4) T1 Ltd. and others v. European Medicines Agency [2019] EWHC 335 (Ch). 
130 MELVIN EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 625 et seq. (Oxford University Press 
2018); Paula Walter, Commercial Impracticability in Contracts, ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW 225, 226 (1986). 
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US would actually also recognize a separate frustration doctrine that is very similar to 
the impracticability doctrine, but would not be used extensively in practice. 
The Restatement (First) of Contracts includes a chapter on Impossibility, which is de-
fined in Section 454 as “not only strict impossibility but impracticability because of ex-
treme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury or loss involved”.131 The difference 
between impracticability and impossibility originates from the case of Mineral Park v. 
Howard. This case was decided well before the Restatement (First) of Contracts and 
is the first to deal with impracticability. It is considered to be akin to Taylor v. Caldwell 
in English law. In Mineral Park v. Howard, the court held that “a thing is impossible in 
legal contemplation when it is not practicable; and a thing is impracticable when it can 
only be done at excessive and unreasonable cost.”132 Performance can be excused 
according to Section 467 if acts existing when a bargain is made or occurring thereafter 
make performance of a promise more difficult or expensive than the parties antici-
pated.133 Additionally, the Restatement (First) of Contracts included Section 288 titled 
“Frustration of the Object or Effect of the Contract”134 in an entirely different part of the 
Restatement (First) of Contracts, defining frustration of purpose exactly as the English 
courts did in Krell v. Henry. However, because it was tucked away and unrelated to 
similar excuses, including no cross-reference to the chapter on Impossibility, the frus-
tration doctrine did not develop in American case law. 
The development of a doctrine of impracticability, however, was advanced in American 
contract law through its incorporation into the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Sec-
tion 2-615, which permits discharge if “performance as agreed has been made imprac-
ticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was the basic 
assumption on which the contract was made . . .”.135 The UCC version of the commer-
cial impracticability doctrine requires an assessment of the tacit assumption shared by 
both parties that a given circumstance upon which the contract was made will either 
persist, occur, or not occur during the contract period (“shared tacit assumption 
test”136). A notion similar to the implied condition found in the English frustration 
 
131 Restatement (First) of Contracts §454 (Am Law Inst 1932). 
132 Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916). 
133 Restatement (First) of Contracts §467 (Am Law Inst 1932). 
134 Restatement (First) of Contracts §288 (Am Law Inst 1932). 
135 U.C.C. § 2-615 (Am Law Inst & Unif. Law Comm’n 2002). 
136 See for this “shared tacit assumption test”: Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 628: “Tacit assumptions 
are not made explicit, even where they are the basis of a contract, precisely because they are taken for 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575869
27 
 
doctrine.137 Such a common tacit assumption is that an unprecedented scenario such 
as the one caused by the COVID-19 pandemic would not occur during the life of the 
contract. Impracticability under the UCC also requires a change in circumstances that 
destroys or alters the basic assumption upon which the contract was made.138 The 
shared tacit assumption test, however, is always subject to the materiality of the impact 
of the unexpected circumstance139 and the assumption of greater liability in the con-
tract itself, or in the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract, including 
trade usages and the like.140  
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which was completed in the 1970s, provides 
“Discharge by Supervening Impracticability” Section 261 in Chapter 11 titled “Imprac-
ticability of Performance and Frustration of Purpose” and states the general principle 
under which a party’s obligation may be discharged due to impracticability:  
Where, after a contract is made, a party’s performance is made impracticable 
without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence of which 
was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his duty to render 
that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances in-
dicate the contrary.141 
Section 261 essentially does little to modify the test found in the UCC Section 2-615, 
which requires a determination of which party assumed the risk for occurrence of an 
event (a change in circumstances) that alters the parties’ shared tacit assumption upon 
which the contract was made,142 rendering performance impracticable (excessively on-
erous). Contrary to the Restatement (First) of Contracts,143 neither the UCC nor the 
 
granted. They are so deeply embedded in the minds of the parties that it simply doesn’t occur to the 
parties to make these assumptions explicit . . . .”  
137 Id. at 662: “Very often, perhaps typically, in such cases, if the parties had addressed the relevant 
circumstance ex ante they would have treated the occurrence or nonoccurrence of the relevant circum-
stance as a condition to the promisor’s obligation to perform.”  
138 See Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1021: “Many parties currently realize that ‚the worlds which they 
assumed when their contract was concluded‘ is not in line with reality, because assumptions on which 
they have implicitly based their will to contract turn out to be incorrect by the dozen. They range from 
the expectation to rely on fit-for-work personnel and a global offer of goods to the general freedom of 
movement. Because these assumptions are so fundamental, the examination of the subjective percep-
tions of the parties reaches its limits and must be substituted by an abstract perspective” (translation by 
the authors).   
139 Id. at 635. 
140 See U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment No. 8 (AM LAW INST & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).; see also Transatlantic 
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F 2nd 312, 316 (D.C Cir. 1966); Barbarossa & Sons, Inc v. Iten Chev-
rolet, Inc., 265 N.W. 2nd 655 (Minn. 1978). 
141 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 (Am Law Inst 1981). 
142 United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 1966); Brunner, supra note 29, at 99.  
143 § 457 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS limited impracticability to situations in which “facts that a 
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Restatement (Second) of Contracts explicitly require the supervening event or change 
in circumstances to be unforeseeable. Therefore, there is some debate as to whether 
foreseeability is a sensu strictu requirement of impracticability144 or just one factor to 
be taken into account when determining the contractual risk allocation.145 
Somewhat oddly, in addition to Section 261 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
and with no corresponding provision in the UCC, there is a Section 265 in Chapter 11 
titled “Discharge by Supervening Frustration” which states the general principle under 
which a party’s obligation may be discharged due to frustration: 
Where, after a contract is made, a party's principal purpose is substantially 
frustrated without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-occurrence 
of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his remain-
ing duties to render performance are discharged, unless the language or the 
circumstances indicate the contrary.146 
Sections 261 and 265 are not so different from one another. They are both based on 
a change in circumstances that alters or destroys the basic assumption upon which 
the contract was made and that either renders performance impracticable or frustrates 
the purpose of the contract. The underlying rationale for both doctrines is almost iden-
tical, and the limited case law in the US on the frustration or purpose doctrine demon-
strates a very narrow understanding of what can frustrate a contract: “discharge of a 
party’s obligations under this doctrine ... has been limited to situations in which a virtu-
ally cataclysmic, wholly unforeseeable event, renders the contract valueless to one 
party.”147 
This shows that, similar to the frustration doctrine of English law, the US impracticability 
doctrine is narrowly construed: “[t]he rationale for the doctrine of impracticability is that 
the circumstance causing the breach has made performance so vitally different from 
 
promisor had no reason to anticipate . . . render performance of the promise impossible”. 
144 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429, 438 (S.D. Fla. 1975). 
145 Opera Co. of Bos. v. Wolf Trap Found. for Performing Arts, 817 F.2d 1094, 1100 (4th Cir. 1987); 
Columbian Nat. Title Ins. Co. v. Twp. Title Servs., Inc., 659 F. Supp. 796, 802 (D. Kan. 1987); Aluminum 
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 76 (W.D. Pa. 1980): “If it were important to the 
decision of this case, the Court would hold that . . . foreseeability . . . would not preclude relief under the 
doctrine of impracticability”; Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2nd 312, 318 
(D.C.Cir.1966): “Foreseeability or even recognition of a risk does not necessarily prove its allocation”; 
Centex Corp. v. Dalton 840 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. 1992); Richard Posner & Andrew Rosenfield, Impossibility 
and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 83, 
100 (1977). 
146 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 265 (Am Law Inst 1981). 
147 United States v. General Douglas MacArthur Senior Village, Inc. 508 F.2d 377, 381 (2nd Cir. 1974). 
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what was anticipated that the contract cannot reasonably be thought to govern.”148 
Only under rare circumstances149 and absent an explicit or implicit risk assumption by 
the aggrieved party could performance be discharged.150 In the Suez Canal scenario 
described above, such a risk assumption was assumed by a US court, and the claim 
for extra costs for a longer journey of the ship around the Cape of Good Hope was 
therefore denied.151 Likewise, the risk for the functioning of an IT-innovation was held 
to have been implicitly assumed by the manufacturer.152 Like under English law, the 
COVID-19 pandemic might be qualified as a case of impracticability because it cannot 
reasonably be assumed that the contract is to be performed under these exceptional 
circumstances.  
In many cases, the COVID-19 scenario will have rendered performance of the contract 
impossible. However, the doctrine does not even require performance to be impossi-
ble. Rather, excessively onerous performance can also be excused.153 However, the 
difficulties that render the performance excessively onerous must be “especially severe 
and unreasonable”154 for the impracticability excuse to succeed.155 Unlike the English 
frustration doctrine, there have been instances in American case law where the im-
practicability excuse succeeds with no supervening event, but with a fundamental 
change in circumstances that rendered performance virtually worthless.156 Overall, 
however, the US impracticability doctrine is similar in content to the English frustration 
 
148 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. 532 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1976). 
149 Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 636: “[C]ontracting parties are more likely to share a tacit assumption 
that a fact of the present world is certain than to share a tacit assumption concerning the certainty of 
some aspect of the future world. . . . Accordingly, courts may appropriately be more reluctant to give 
relief in unexpected circumstances cases, which concern future states of the world . . .”. 
150 ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS Vol. II, para. 9.6 (Aspen Law & Business 2nd ed. 
1998). 
151 Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318 (D.C.Cir.1966). 
152 United States v. Wegematic Corp, 360 F.2d 674, 675 (2nd Cir. 1966). 
153 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, Comment d (AM LAW INST 1981): “[I]mpracticability 
means more than impracticality”; see also U.C.C. § 2-615, Comment 4 (AM LAW INST & UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N): “Increased costs alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some 
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the performance.”; See Transatlantic Fi-
nancing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
154 Rivkin, supra note 52, at 169, quoting from Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus-
tries, 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1324 (E.D. La. 1981) and emphasizing that pursuant to that judgement, an 
increase of 38% over the original contract price due to rises in the costs of raw materials “did not in-
crease to the extent necessary to excuse its performance under the doctrine of commercial impractica-
bility”. 
155 Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. 826 F.2d 239 (1987): in one of the more 
well-known examples of discharge due to impracticability, a contract in relation to disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel anticipated to generate 20 million dollars in profit would have resulted in a loss of 80 million 
dollars due to an unforeseen cancellation of a government program.   
156 Brunner, supra note 29, at 97 et seq. 
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doctrine and less restrictive than it; while at the same time being much more restrictive 
than the type of hardship doctrines developed in civil law jurisdictions. 
4.3. Transnational contract law 
As far as transnational contract law is concerned, the force majeure excuse may rightly 
be characterized as a truly transnational legal principle. For a number of reasons, that 
principle is part of the “New Lex Mercatoria”.157 First, most international contracts have 
contained and will continue to contain force majeure clauses. Second, the force 
majeure doctrine was explicitly recognized as a general principle of law by the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal.158 Third, the force majeure doctrine is reflected in both 
the CISG and the UPICC. 
The force majeure exemptions under Art. 79 CISG and Art. 7.1.7 UPICC have over-
come the differences contained in most domestic legal systems. They reflect a good 
digest of the decisive requirements of the transnational force majeure doctrine. 
Art. 7.1.7 UPICC provides: 
1. Non-performance by a party is excused if that party proves that the non-
performance was due to an impediment beyond its control and that it could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its con-
sequences; 
 
157 R. Doak Bishop, International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a Lex Petrolea, 
23 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 1131, 1169 (1998); Norbert Horn, Changes in Circumstances and the Revision of 
Contracts in Some European Laws and in International Law, in ADAPTATION AND RENEGOTIATION OF 
CONTRACTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE 15, 26 (Norbert Horn ed., Kluwer 1985); Rivkin, supra 
note 52, at 165 et seq.; Michael Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First Twenty-five Years, 4 ARB. 
INT'L. 86 (1988). 
158 Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 199, 211-212 (1986), excerpts available at: 
https://www.trans-lex.org/231800 (accessed April 20, 2020): “Under a variety of names most, if not all, 
legal systems recognize force majeure as an excuse for contractual non-performance. Force majeure 
therefore can be considered a general principle of law”); Questech Inc. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 
107 (1985), excerpts available at: https://www.trans-lex.org/231400 (accessed April 20, 2020); see also 
Mobil Oil Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 39, para. 117 (1987), excerpts available at: 
www.trans-lex.org/232000 (accessed April 20, 2020); Maurizio Brunetti, The Lex Mercatoria in Practice: 
The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 18 ARB. INT'L. 355, 359 (2002), excerpts 
available at: www.trans-lex.org/100950 (accessed April 20, 2020); John Crook, Applicable Law in 
International Arbitration: The Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal Experience, 83 AM. J. INT'L. L. 278, 293 (1989), 
excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/120000 (accessed April 20, 2020); John Westberg, Contract 
Excuse in International Business Transactions: Awards of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 4 
ICSID REV. 215, 238 et seq.(1989). 
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2. When the impediment is only temporary, the excuse shall have effect for 
such period as is reasonable having regard to the effect of the impediment on 
the performance of the contract; 
3. The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the 
impediment and its effect on its ability to perform. If the notice is not received 
by the other party within a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform 
knew or ought to have known of the impediment, it is liable for damages re-
sulting from such non-receipt. 
4. Nothing in this article prevents a party from exercising a right to terminate 
the contract or to withhold performance or request interest on money due.159 
This provision and other transnational rules160 are essentially in line with its French 
origin.161 However, there is one subtle distinction and that is that the transnational force 
majeure doctrine and the application of force majeure clauses in contracts do not ap-
pear to be grounded in impossibility, which of course is the sole justification for the 
original French doctrine. This deemphasis on impossibility in turn explains why the 
requirements for the application of force majeure clauses or the transnational force 
majeure doctrine end up looking very similar to the hardship doctrine.162  
All combined, the transnational rules and the practice of international long-term con-
tracting have led to the general understanding that the force majeure excuse for non-
performance as a transnational doctrine and as a contractual clause is based on the 
following four cumulative requirements:163 
 
159 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, Art. 7.1.7 (UNIDROIT ed., 2017). 
160 Art. 8:108 Principles of European Contract Law; Art. III-3:103 Draft Common Frame of Reference; 
TransLex-Principle VI.3., www.trans-lex.org/944000 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
161 See, e.g., Barry Nicholas, Force majeure in French law, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF 
CONTRACT 21, 24 (Ewan McKendrick ed., Lloyd's of London Press 2nd ed. 1995); Rüfner, supra note 
14, Art. 8:108, No. 13; ICC Case No. 10527 of 2000, 131 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 1263, 
1264 (2004), excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/210527 (accessed April 20, 2020); CAP Case No. 
3150, 39 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 65, 72 (2014) (Paris Chamber of International Arbitration), excerpts available 
at: www.trans-lex.org/203150 (accessed April 20, 2020); ICC Case No. 3099/3100 of 1979, Collection 
of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 67, 70 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds. 1990); ICC Case No. 
3093/3100 of 1979, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 365, 367 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves De-
rains eds. 1990). 
162 See infra Section 5.3. 
163 Brunner, supra note 29, at 111 et seq.; Brunner, supra note 16, at 85; Nassar, supra note 49, at 207 
et seq.; STEPHAN SCHMITZ, ALLGEMEINE RECHTSGRUNDSÄTZE IN DER RECHTSPRECHUNG DES IRAN-UNITED 
STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL EINE UNTERSUCHUNG ÜBER DAS ANWENDBARE RECHT, NACHTRÄGLICHE 
LEISTUNGSHINDERNISSE UND ENTLASTUNGSGRÜNDE SOWIE UNGERECHTFERTIGTE BEREICHERUNG 146 et 
seq. (Peter Lang 1992); TransLex-Principle VI.3 (a), www.trans-lex.org/944000 (accessed April 20, 
2020); ICC Case No. 2142 of 1974, 1 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 132 (1976), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/202142 (accessed April 20, 2020); ICC Case No. 3880 of 1983, 10 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 44 (1985), 
excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/203880 (accessed April 20, 2020); ICC Case No. 5864 of 1989, 
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− Externality: The occurrence of an external event164 for which the obligor has not 
assumed the risk;  
− Unavoidability/Irresistibility: The occurrence of the external event165 was beyond 
the obligor’s (typical) sphere of control/the ordinary organization of his busi-
ness166 and was absolute;167 
− Unforeseeability: The event and its consequences, i.e. the adverse impact on the 
obligor’s ability to perform, could not reasonably have been avoided or overcome 
by the obligor, e.g. by alternative and commercially reasonable (measured 
against the risk-distribution in the contract) modes of performance, procurement 
or transportation, or other safety measures;168  
− Causation (“conditio sine qua non” or “but-for” test): The obligor’s non-perfor-
mance was, as a “matter of commercial reality”,169 caused by the external event 
and not by the obligor’s own fault, e.g. by self-inflicted production problems, de-
fective goods or packaging etc.170 
 
124 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 1073, 1076 (1997), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/205864 (accessed April 20, 2020); ICC Case No. 8501 of 1996, 128 Journal du droit international 
(Clunet) 1164, 1166 (2001); ICC Case No. 2216 of 1974, 102 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 917, 
919 (1975), excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/202216 (accessed April 20, 2020); Michael 
Polkinghorne & Charles Rosenberg, Expecting the Unexpected: The Force Majeure Clause, 16 BUS. L. 
INT'L 49, 57 (2015); Art. 1 ICC Force Majeure and Hardship Clauses March 2020, ICC Force Majeure 
Clause („Long Form“), https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-forcemajeure-hardship-
clauses-march2020.pdf. 
164 See the list of typical force majeure events in Translex Principle VI.3. (c), www.trans-lex.org/944000 
(accessed April 20, 2020); see also 1. Gujarat State Petroleum Corp. Ltd., 2. Alkor Petro Ltd., 3. Western 
Drilling Contractors Private Ltd. v. 1. Republic of Yemen, 2. The Yemeni Ministry of Oil and Minerals, 
ICC Case No. 19299 of 2015, text available at https://www.italaw.com/cases/4209 (accessed April 20, 
2020); Klaus Peter Berger, Force Majeure Clauses and their Relationship with the Applicable Law, 
General Principles of Law and Trade Usages, in HARDSHIP AND FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 144 (Fabio Bortolotti & Dorothy Ufot eds., ICC 2018). 
165 Events which are external to the obligor’s sphere of risk are usually also unavoidable, Pichonnaz, 
supra note 29, at Art. 7.17, No. 22. 
166 See, e.g., Ad Hoc-Award of September 9, 1983, 12 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 63, 74 (1987), excerpts available 
at: www.trans-lex.org/260300 (accessed April 20, 2020), stating that a state enterprise which is inte-
grated into the state economic plan may not invoke a change of that plan as a force majeure event.  
167 CAP Case No. 3150, 39 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 65, 72 (2014) (Paris Chamber of International Arbitration), 
excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/203150 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
168 Pichonnaz, supra note 29, at Art. 7.17, para. 26: “If a diligent merchant is expected to take alternative 
measures in the obligor’s place, these have to be taken; even a substantial loss due to additional costs 
should not be enough to justify the absence of alternative measures.” 
169 Alan Berg, The detailed drafting of a force majeure clause, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF 
CONTRACT 63, 71 (Ewan McKendrick ed., Lloyd's of London Press 2nd ed. 1995). 
170 Classic Maritime Inc v. Limbungan Makmur SDN BHD [2019] EWCA Civ. 1102, para. 45: “It is a valid 
use of language to say that a failure to supply the cargo (or even a cargo) does not ‘result from’ an event 
if in fact the event makes no difference because the charterer was never going to supply a cargo any-
way”; see also Bremer Handelsgesellschaft v. Vanden Avenne-Izegem [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 109, para. 
82 (CA) (quoted in para. 19 of the above judgement: “[The force majeure clause] is concerned with 
excusing a party from liability for a breach which has occurred. In such a context it would be a surprise 
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The COVID-19 pandemic meets this four-pronged test, provided that a court or arbitral 
tribunal confirms that the pandemic constitutes a force majeure event.171 The pan-
demic clearly is an external event. In Europe, it was also unforeseeable, at least with 
respect to contracts concluded before February 2020.172 It is true that some medical 
experts have emphasized the threat of zoonotic spillover, i.e. the transmission of path-
ogens from nonhuman animals to humans for many years, and have hinted at the fact 
that the elevation of spillover events is two to three times higher now than 40 years 
ago, driven by the huge increase in the human population and expansion into wildlife 
areas.173 Virologists have also predicted for many years that a pandemic such as the 
SARS of 2002-2004 could break out again.174 In a comprehensive risk analysis study 
conducted by the German government-related Robert-Koch Institute together with a 
number of German government agencies, which was published by the German Parlia-
ment in January 2013, the occurrence of a hypothetical viral pandemic such as COVID-
19 was qualified as “conditionally probable” (“bedingt wahrscheinlich”), i.e. as an event 
which, ”statistically, would occur once in a period of 100 to 1,000 years”.175 At the same 
 
that a party could be excused from liability where, although an event within the clause had occurred 
which made performance impossible, the party would not have performed in any event for different 
reasons . . .”. 
171 See supra Section 4. 
172 Weller, et al., supra note 4, 1021; see also Heinich, supra note 13.  
173 Scientists are confident that the COVI-19 outbreak, which began in Wuhan, China, stemmed from a 
virus inherent in bats which are considered to be a reservoir for coronaviruses and which were sold on 
a fish market there, Berger, The Man Who Saw the Pandemic Coming- Will the world now wake up to 
the global threat of zoonotic diseases?, http://nautil.us/issue/83/intelligence/the-man-who-saw-the-pan-
demic-coming, interviewing Dennis Carroll, Former Director of the pandemic influenza and emerging 
threats unit at the federal Agency for International Development (USAID) for nearly 15 years who now 
heads the Global Virome Project at Texas A&M University: “Do you think the current outbreak was 
inevitable? Oh, sure. It was predictable. It’s like if you had no traffic laws and were constantly finding 
pedestrians getting whacked by cars as they crossed the street”; see also Zhou/Yang/Wang et al, A 
pneumonia outbreak associated with a new coronavirus of probable bat origin, Nature 579, 270-273 
(2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed?term=32015507; Zhou/Zang/Wang, A Novel Coronavirus 
from Patients with Pneumonia in China, 2019,N. Engl. J. Med. 2020, 727 et seq.   
174 Event 201, A Global pandemic Exercise, http://www.centerforhealthsecurity.org/event201/about: “In 
recent years, the world has seen a growing number of epidemic events, amounting to approximately 
200 events annually. These events are increasing, and they are disruptive to health, economies, and 
society. Managing these events already strains global capacity, even absent a pandemic threat. Experts 
agree that it is only a matter of time before one of these epidemics becomes global—a pandemic with 
potentially catastrophic consequences. A severe pandemic, which becomes “Event 201,” would require 
reliable cooperation among several industries, national governments, and key international institutions” 
(emphasis added); see also Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (GPMB), A World at Risk, Annual 
Report on Global Preparedness for Health Emergencies, September 2019, p. 11 et seq: “The world is 
at acute risk for devastating regional or global disease epidemics or pandemics that not only cause loss 
of life but upend economies and create social chaos. 
175 Risikoanalyse Bevölkerungsschutz Bund: Pandemie durch Virus „Modi-SARS, Deutscher Bundes-
tag: Drucksachen [BT] 17/12051 of 3 January 2013, Annex 4, p. 55, 56: http://dipbt.bundes-
tag.de/doc/btd/17/120/1712051.pdf (Ger.); the study predicts almost all of the circumstances surround-
ing the COVID-19 pandemia. 
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time, the German study makes it clear that the COVID-19 scenario was not foreseeable 
per se, given that no one could predict when and where such a pandemic would oc-
cur.176 In spite of the disastrous and potentially lethal nature and systemic conse-
quences of quickly spreading infectious diseases, parties to international contracts 
cannot be expected to be “on permanent alert”. In the legal context of the force majeure 
doctrine, the COVID-19 pandemic must thus be characterized as an “an event so un-
likely to occur that reasonable business parties see no need explicitly to allocate the 
risk of its occurrence, although the impact it might have would be of such magnitude 
that the parties would have negotiated over it, had the event been more likely”.177  
With respect to regular force majeure events, the unforeseeability of the event does 
not necessarily imply that the event was also beyond the obligor’s sphere of control/the 
ordinary organization of his business, i.e. was unavoidable. The distinction between 
these two requirements is reflected in the 2020 ICC Force Majeure Model Clause. 
While the events listed in the clause as “Presumed Force Majeure Events” relieve the 
affected party from proving the unforeseeability of the event, the Model Clause also 
states that this party must in any case prove that it could not have avoided or overcome 
the effects of the impediment.178 However, the relationship between both requirements 
is influenced by the severity of the force majeure event. The severe global conse-
quences of the COVID-19 pandemic, which affected multiple business sectors and not 
just individual companies or employees – for example with respect to lockdowns, quar-
antine of personnel, interruption of global supply chains etcetera –, make it easier for 
the affected party to prove the unavoidability of its non-performance.179 
The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has rightly emphasized that “force majeure being an ex-
ception to the obligation to perform [i.e. the pacta principle], a party that invokes it has 
the burden of proving that [the above four] conditions of force majeure existed with 
 
176 Id., at 66 “The occurence of new diseases [such as COVID-19] is a natural event which may occur 
over and over again. However, it is not foreseeable in practice which new infectious diseases may occur, 
where they occur and when this will happen” (translation by the authors) (emphasis added). 
177 See for this definition of unforeseeability Brunner, supra note 29, at 158 with reference to Pietro 
Trimarchi, Commercial impracticability in contract law: An economic analysis, 11 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 
63, 65 (1991).  
178 See the annotations to Art. 3 of the 2020 ICC Force Majeure Model Cause, https://iccwbo.org/con-
tent/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-forcemajeure-hardship-clauses-march2020.pdf (accessed April 20, 
2020). 
179 See Brunner, supra note 29, at 168: “...the obligor may be excused if illnesses, deaths or vacancies 
of employees are caused by extraordinary external events as in the case of an epidemic affecting the 
obligors entire personnel…“; see also Wagner, et al., supra note 69, at 846. 
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regard to the contractual obligations which it did not perform”.180 Since Force majeure 
is a defense invoked by the non-performing party, this distribution of the burden of 
proof follows from another transnational legal principle: “actori incumbit onus proba-
tio”.181 This distribution of the burden of proof is another reason for the restrictive ap-
plication of the force majeure doctrine: In those not infrequent cases in which the exact 
cause of the supervening external event cannot be established, a court or arbitral tri-
bunal will typically not allow the force majeure defense to succeed.182 
Finally, the party invoking the force majeure doctrine is obliged to notify his contractual 
partner in writing of the existence and nature of the disruptive event and his intention 
to make use of the force majeure exception in order to prevent surprises of the other 
side.183 That notice requirement is also reflected in Art. 79(4) CISG, Art. 7.1.7(3) 
UPICC, other transnational contract principles184 and in most contractual force majeure 
clauses.185 It follows from these same provisions that if the aggrieved party violates its 
duty to notify the other side, it has not forfeited its right to invoke the force majeure 
exception, but the other party is entitled to damages.186 It must be compensated for 
every kind of loss it could have avoided if it had been informed in time and in sufficient 
form and detail. This duty to notify is also part of the transnational force majeure doc-
trine.187 
 
180 Sylvania Technical Systems v. Iran, 8 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 298, 312 (1985). 
181 See TransLex-Principle XII.1, www.trans-lex.org/966000 (accessed April 20, 2020); ICC Award No. 
3344, 109 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 978, 983 (1982), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/203344 (accessed April 20, 2020); Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. The Republic of Sri Lanka, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990), 16 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 106, 122 (1991), excerpts 
available at: www.trans-lex.org/240500 (accessed April 20, 2020); Cheng, supra note 37, at 327; 
PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, L' ARBITRAGE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL 441 (Dalloz 1965); see also for English 
law Tradax Export S.A. v. André et Cie [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 416 (CA); Channel Island Ferries Ltd. v. 
Sealink U.K. Ltd. [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 323 (CA); Avimex S.A. v. Dewulf & Cie [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57 
at 67 (QB Comm.). 
182 Rüfner, supra note 14, at Art. 8:108, No. 28. 
183 Brunner, supra note 29, at 342 et seq. 
184 See, e.g., TransLex-Principle VI.3 (d), www.trans-lex.org/944000 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
185 Berg, supra note 169, at 99 et seq.; see, e.g., ICC Case No. 2478 of 1974, 3 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 222, 
223 (1978); ICC Case No. 4237 of 1974, 10 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 52, 57 (1985). 
186 Brunner, supra note 29, at 103 with reference to ICC awards; Pichonnaz, supra note 29, at Art. 7.17, 
para. 41. 
187 See TransLex-Principle VI.3 (d), www.trans-lex.org/944000 (accessed April 20, 2020); ICC Case No. 
5864 of 1989, 124 Journal du droit international (Clunet) 1073, 1076 (1997), excerpts available at: 
www.trans-lex.org/205864 (accessed April 20, 2020); ICC Case No. 8790 of 2000, 29 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 
13, 21 (2004), excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/208790 (accessed April 20, 2020); Lockheed 
Corp. v. Iran, 18 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 292, 300 et seq. (1988), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/232200 (accessed April 20, 2020); Touche Ross v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 284, 294 et 
seq. (1985), excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/231500 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
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If the force majeure doctrine invoked by a non-performing party has met the four re-
quirements outlined above, contractual performance is, depending on the nature and 
duration of the supervening external event, partially or totally,188 temporarily or perma-
nently,189 suspended, with the aggrieved party being under an obligation to continue 
to perform only insofar as this is reasonable under the circumstances.190 Termination 
of the contract is only an “ultima ratio” remedy and the parties are compensated for 
performance already rendered.191 
In international contracting practice, the regulation of force majeure events is often left 
to boilerplate clauses.192 Rather than providing legal certainty when force majeure 
events occur, some of those clauses may raise difficult problems of contract interpre-
tation.193 The four fundamental requirements of the transnational force majeure doc-
trine may serve as a yardstick for the internationally useful construction194 of such force 
majeure clauses by an arbitral tribunal.195 However, intricate questions may remain. 
 
188 Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 199, 211-212 (1986), excerpts available at: 
www.trans-lex.org/231800 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
189 See Brunner, supra note 29, at 98-99: “Generally, impediments to performance only exempt the 
obligor as long as they exist” and adding that a temporary may be requalified as a permanent impedi-
ment „when it appears reasonable that the impediment will persist for the whole or such a large part of 
the period allowed by the contract for performance as to substantially interfere with the contractual pur-
pose”; see also ICC Case No. 18982, quoted by Brunner, supra note 29, at 99-100 (who was a member 
of the tribunal in that arbitration); see also ICC Case No. 7539 of 1995, 123 Journal du droit international 
(Clunet) 1030 (1996), excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/207539 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
190 Touche Ross v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 284, 298 (1985), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/231500 (accessed April 20, 2020): “While the valid invocation of force majeure provides a de-
fense against a possible claim for breach of contract based on failure to perform, it does not, in the 
circumstances of this case, relieve the invoking party of the obligation to continue to do whatever is still 
reasonable to carry out its duties under the Contract.” 
191 Anaconda-Iran, Inc. v. Iran, 13 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 199 (1986), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/231800 (accessed April 20, 2020); Mobile Oil Iran v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 38 et 
seq. (1987); Gould Marketing, Inc. v. Ministry of National Defence, 3 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 147 (1983); 
International Schools Inc. v. Iran, 14 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 65 (1987); SCHMITZ, supra note 163, at 163 
et seq. 
192 Polkinghorne & Rosenberg, supra note 163, at 57, warning against the use of vague formulations in 
such clauses; see for the ICC model clauses and their revision Filip de Ly, Analysing the ICC Force 
Majeure Clause 2003, in HARDSHIP AND FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 113 
(Fabio Bortolotti & Dorothy Ufot eds., ICC 2018), Ercüment Erdem, Revision of the ICC Force Majeure 
and Hardship Clause, in HARDSHIP AND FORCE MAJEURE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 123 
(Fabio Bortolotti & Dorothy Ufot eds., ICC 2018). 
193 Brunner, supra note 29, at 83; Berger, supra note 164, at 138 et seq.; Pichonnaz, supra note 29, at 
Art. 7.17, No.13. 
194 See for this approach to the construction of international contracts: Klaus Peter Berger, Vom 
praktischen Nutzen der Rechtsvergleichung: Die international brauchbare Auslegung nationalen 
Rechts, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR OTTO SANDROCK ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 49 (Klaus Peter Berger, et al. eds., 
Verlag Recht und Wirtschaft 2000). 
195 Brunner, supra note 29, at 107; see also Berg, supra note 169, at 75; ICC Case No. 2478 of 1974, 3 
Y.B. Comm. Arb. 222, 223 (1978). 
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One relates to the proper relationship and hierarchy between force majeure and hard-
ship clauses in the same contract.196  
Another concerns the question whether the list of force majeure events in the contrac-
tual clause is exhaustive or whether it merely provides examples of events with char-
acteristics that may be used to admit unlisted force majeure events which share the 
same qualities197 or which constitute force majeure events “in the sense of generally 
accepted principles”.198 Scenarios like the COVID-19 pandemic are covered by such 
clauses. Some force majeure clauses specifically list “diseases”, “plagues”, “epidem-
ics”, “health emergencies”199 or similar health-related situations as force majeure 
events. For example, the recently revised ICC Force Majeure Model Clause of March 
2020 lists plagues and epidemics as “Presumed Force Majeure Events”.200 In the ab-
sence of proof to the contrary, such events shall be presumed to be uncontrollable and 
unforeseeable force majeure events, provided that the party invoking force majeure 
is able to prove that the effects of the impediment could not reasonably have been 
avoided or overcome.201 The same ICC Clause lists these health-related events to-
gether with “natural disasters” or “extreme natural events”. The COVID-19 pan-
demic has been characterized as “a natural catastrophe in slow motion”202 or a 
“natural event”.203 There is thus an argument to be made, for example in jurisdic-
tions which apply a rather strict approach to the interpretation of such clauses204, 
that even clauses which only list such “natural” events may be understood to also 
cover the COVID-19 scenario. Even if this is not the case, a typical force majeure 
clause may be applied to the current pandemic if it lists not only specific force majeure 
 
196 Furmston, supra note 56, at 62. 
197 Fyffes Group Ltd. v. Reefer Express Lines Pty Ltd. [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171, 196 (Comm.); ICC 
Case No. 11265 of 2009, 20(2) ICC Int’l Ct. of Arb. Bull. 53 (2009); ICC Case No. 3093/3100 of 1979, 
Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 365, 366 (Sigvard Jarvin & Yves Derains eds. 1990). 
198 See ICC Case No. 16369 of 2011, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 2012-2015 313, 342 (Jean-
Jacques Arnaldez et al. eds. 2019). 
199 See, e.g., Clifford Gardner v. Clydesdale Bank Ltd [2013] EWHC 4356, para. 25 (Ch).  




202 Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1017 quoting the renowned German virologist Christian Drosten. 
203 Risikoanalyse Bevölkerungsschutz Bund: Pandemie durch Virus „Modi-SARS, Deutscher Bundes-
tag: Drucksachen [BT] 17/12051 of 3 January 2013, Annex 4, p. 55, 66: http://dipbt.bundes-
tag.de/doc/btd/17/120/1712051.pdf (Ger.) (accessed April 20, 2020). 
204 See, e.g., Kel Kim Corp. v. Central. Markets Inc. 524 N.Y.S.2d 384 (Court of Appeals of New York, 
1987) “Ordinarily, only if the force majeure clause specifically includes the event that actually prevents 
a party’s performance will that party be excused.” 
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events, but also includes a catch-all phrase to cover similar situations (“…and any 
event of a similar nature”). Hardship clauses can also cover scenarios like the COVID-
19 pandemic without the need to enter into an analysis of their wording, since they 
usually do not list specific events, but contain a sweeping reference to “events beyond 
the reasonable control” of the party invoking hardship.205 
5. Hardship 
Hardship is concerned with situations in which the performance of contractual obliga-
tions has not become impossible for the aggrieved party. Unlike a party confronted 
with a force majeure event, that party can still perform, but in doing so it is confronted 
with fundamental difficulties not anticipated at the time the contract was concluded. 
The possibility to continue specific performance of the contract despite the excessive 
impact of the change of circumstances is a characteristic feature of hardship.206 In the 
COVID-19 pandemic, this possibility is not given in most of the cases. However, in a 
number of scenarios, performance of the contract, albeit in a modified form, might still 
be possible, provided the contract could be adapted to these changed circum-
stances.207 In the following sections, we will discuss how various iterations of the hard-
ship doctrine have developed and how they operate in domestic jurisdictions as well 
as in the transnational context. 
5.1. The common law reluctance 
Among others, countries like Germany, France, Greece, Austria, Italy, Poland, Hun-
gary, Portugal, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Russia, Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Colom-
bia, Japan and Egypt have adopted statutory or judge-made rules on hardship.208 
These are all civil law jurisdictions. In the common law world, a hardship doctrine is not 
accepted or at least not to the same extent. In any event the common law doctrines 
relating to hardship developed along a completely different path from the civil law ver-
sions of the hardship doctrine. The reason for this is that there are different dogmatic 
conceptions of the binding force of contracts in common law jurisdictions, which along 
 
205 See, e.g., Art. 2 a) 2020 ICC Hardship Clause, https://iccwbo.org/content/up-
loads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-forcemajeure-hardship-clauses-march2020.pdf; see also TransLex-Principle 
VIII.1, https://www.trans-lex.org/951000 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
206 Accaoui Lorfing, supra note 66, at 450. 
207 Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1022. 
208 See Brunner, supra note 29, at 402 et seq.; ICC Case No. 16369 of 2011, Collection of ICC Arbitral 
Awards 2012 – 2015 313, 343 (Jean-Jacques Arnaldez et al. eds. 2019). 
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with other historic idiosyncrasies, prevented the recognition of any type of Canon law 
doctrine of changed circumstances under the common law. On the other hand, and 
while still subject to some idiosyncrasies and selective transplants, the civil law tradi-
tion would historically be much more amenable to the Canon law doctrine of changed 
circumstances and the later hardship doctrine because in these jurisdictions the bind-
ing force of a contract merely requires an agreement with an intent to be bound. Such 
a requirement therefore would allow most civil law jurisdictions to accept a doctrine 
that excuses performance if the reason why the parties agreed to be bound fundamen-
tally changes; and many of them have. 
A contract in the common law tradition requires consideration (a bargained-for ex-
change) to be enforceable, which will bind the parties regardless of whether the pur-
pose of the contract disappears at a later time: “a man must stick to his bargain”.209 
Therefore, at common law, no relevance is placed on a valid reason for the agreement: 
once there is consideration, there is a valid contract, and issues of fairness and moral-
ity are irrelevant so long as the agreement is legally enforceable. The pacta principle, 
which has its roots in the idea that parties can create binding contractual obligations 
only through their mutual consent,210 prevails in these circumstances, i.e. the parties 
remain strictly bound by the terms of their bargain even if performance becomes more 
onerous for one of them.  
As discussed in Section 4.2.2 above, English law does recognize a form of a hardship 
doctrine, but much more limited than any hardship doctrine in civil law jurisdictions. 
The frustration doctrine in English law can excuse performance in cases of extreme 
economic or commercial loss, but the English courts have no power to adapt the con-
tract to changed circumstances.211 This strict approach has rightly been criticized as 
not being in line with commercial reality: 
I would hazard the respectful observation that most commercial people would 
find it an offensive conclusion that, having entered into a contract on the basis 
of a common assumption or with shared acceptance of a certain state of 
 
209 Parry, supra note 30, at 1 et seq.; Nassar, supra note 49, at 3 et seq.; James Gordley, Natural Law 
Origins of the Common Law of Contract, in TOWARDS A GENERAL LAW OF CONTRACT 367, 370 et seq. 
(John Barton ed., Duncker & Humblot 1st ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, Chapter 
16 (Remedies), Introductory Note (AM LAW INST 1981).  
210 Weller, supra note 35, at 38. 
211 See supra Section 4.2.2. 
This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3575869
40 
 
affairs, when those assumptions are falsified by subsequent events the parties 
should nonetheless be held strictly to their contract.212 
As provided in Section 4.2.3 above, US law does recognize a form of the hardship 
doctrine, but similar to English law, the hardship doctrine in US law is extremely limited 
in application. The impracticability doctrine in US law can excuse performance in cases 
where a contract becomes excessively onerous due to a dramatic and unexpected rise 
in cost resulting in a financial loss that was not bargained for,213 but US courts’ powers 
are limited to releasing such a party fully or partially from its duty to perform.214 
5.2. Civil law jurisdictions 
When considering those civil law legal systems that have developed hardship doc-
trines, there are two main approaches.215 One is centered on the scenario in which 
performing contractual obligations has become excessively onerous for one party. An-
other broader approach considers more generally situations where the “foundations of 
the transaction” have been destroyed or substantially modified, thereby bringing the 
hardship doctrine in those jurisdictions closer to impossibility and force majeure, i.e. 
events rendering the performance of the contract impossible to perform as originally 
contemplated.  
5.2.1. France: From outright rejection by the courts to a narrow statutory 
approach  
Until 2016, France stood out in the civil law world with its complete rejection of a hard-
ship doctrine (“théorie de l’imprévision”) in private law.216 This is the result of the Canon 
law doctrine of changed circumstances not having made its way into the Code Napo-
léon. In 1876, the French Cour de Cassation had condemned l’imprévision in the case 
Canal de Craponne, which is considered to be one of the most important court 
 
212 Andrew Rogers, Frustration and estoppel, in FORCE MAJEURE AND FRUSTRATION OF CONTRACT 245, 
246 (Ewan McKendrick ed., Lloyd's of London Press 2nd ed. 1995) in reaction to Davis Contractors Ltd. 
v. Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696 [714 et seq.]: “It may be sad that [the parties] made 
the contract on the ‘basis’ or on the ‘footing’ that their expectations would be fulfilled . . . . But it by no 
means follows that disappointed expectations lead to frustrated contracts”; see also Rogers, id, at 245: 
“The operation of the doctrine of frustration is one of the least successful of the efforts of lawyers to 
meet the needs of commerce”. 
213 See for this “unbargained-for risk test” Eisenberg, supra note 130, at 643 et seq. 
214 See supra Section 4.2.3. 
215 Fontaine, supra note 58, at para. 12. 
216 See PÉDAMON & CHUAH, supra note 34, at 22 et seq. 
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judgements in the area of French private law.217 In that judgement, the Court invoked 
the binding force of contracts in Art. 1134 of the Code Napoléon of 1804218 to justify its 
refusal to adapt a fee for the maintenance of a canal, the amount of which had been 
agreed between the parties in 1567. In spite of the obvious need to adapt the fee, the 
court ruled that a court cannot modify a contract unless there is a provision of law 
allowing it to do so.219 There was none in French law at the time of the judgement. 
For a long time, this position has been generally criticized and gradually diluted by an 
increasing number of exceptions.220 Still the French Cour de Cassation held to its po-
sition.221 The French courts were concerned that to decide otherwise would open un-
acceptable loopholes for parties who seek to escape their contractual commitments. 
Additionally, leaving contract adaptation to the discretion of the courts was regarded 
as undermining legal certainty in contract law.  
Commercial parties tried to escape this strict case law by resorting to arbitration, and 
by including adaptation222 or renegotiation223 clauses into their contracts or allowing 
 
217 Cass civ., Mar. 6, 1876, Canal de Craponne, D 1876 I, 193; see generally Abas, supra note 16, at 
48 et seq. 
218 The provision has since been reformed. The version in force at the time of the judgement read: “Les 
conventions légalement formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent être 
révoquées que de leur consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi autorise”; English translation 
by the authors: “Agreements lawfully entered into take the place of the law for those who have made 
them. They may be revoked only by mutual consent, or for causes authorized by law.” 
219 Canal de Craponne, id.: “Dans aucun cas, il n’appartient aux tribunaux, quelque équitable que puisse 
apparaître leur décision, de prendre en considération le temps et les circonstances pour modifier les 
conventions des parties et substituer des clauses nouvelles à celles qui ont été librement acceptées par 
les contractants”; see also HENRI CAPITANT, et al., LES GRANDS ARRÊTS DE LA JURISPRUDENCE CIVILE Vol. II, 
172 et seq (Dalloz 2nd ed. 2015); see for cases of legislative allowance of contract revision PÉDAMON & 
CHUAH, supra note 34, at 35. 
220 Against the theory: CHRISTOPHE JAMIN, ET AL., LES EFFETS DU CONTRAT PARAS 296, 348 (Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence 3rd ed. 2001); ARNE ALBERTS, WEGFALL DER 
GESCHÄFTSGRUNDLAGE: NACHTRÄGLICHE ÄQUIVALENZSTÖRUNGEN IM DEUTSCHEN UND FRANZÖSISCHEN 
VERTRAGSRECHT 78 et seq. (Nomos 2015); GABRIEL MARTY & PIERRE RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL — LES 
OBLIGATIONS Vol. I, paras. 250 et seq. (Sirey 2nd ed. 1988); Valérie Boccara & Gaëlle Marraud Des 
Grottes, Les notaires face aux défis du siècle, Petites affiches - n°117 (2004) 3, 6 ; Ripert, supra note 
39, at 151; Charles Gavoty & Olivier Edwards, Vers une extension de l'obligation de renégociation en 
matière contractuelle ?, Petites affiches - n°128 (2004) 18, 19 ; Pascal Ancel, Imprevision, in Repertoire 
de droit civil paras. 4 and 31 (Dallloz 2017); Louis Thibierge, Le contrat face à l'imprévu (Economica 
2011); in favor of the theory: Denis Mazeaud, La révision du contrat, Petites affiches - n°129 (2005) 4, 
paras. 28 et seq.; Catherine Thibierge, Libres propos sur la transformation du droit des contrats, Revue 
trimestrielle de droit civil 357, paras. 28 et seq. (1997); Prosper Weil, et al., Les grands arrêts de la 
jurisprudence administrative No. 29, p. 179, para. 5 (Dalloz 22nd ed. 2019); François Terré, et al., Droit 
civil: Les obligations para. 471 (Dalloz 12th ed. 2019). 
221 See, e.g., Cass. civ., Nov. 15, 1933, Gaz. Pal. 1934 I 68 “La règle que les conventions légalement 
formées tiennent lieu de loi à ceux qui les ont faites est générale et absolue.”; see also Lutzi, supra note 
46, at 95 with reference to French case law. 
222 See, e.g., ICC Case No. 2708 of 1976, Collection of ICC Arbitral Awards 1974-1985 297 (Sigvard 
Jarvin & Yves Derains eds. 1990). 
223 See Terré, supra note 221, at paras. 474 and 1331 et seq.; Ancel, supra note 220, at paras. 101 et 
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arbitrators to act as amiables compositeurs, freed from the constraints of the law.224 
Only in the field of administrative contracts (“contrats administratifs”) did the French 
Conseil d’Etat, the highest administrative court, accept the théorie de l’imprévision and 
allowed for the judicial adaption of such contracts in the case of changed circum-
stances in a decision of 1916. It justified that decision with the “public interest in the 
continuation of public services”,225 which subsequently assumed the quality of a con-
stitutional principle.226 However, even though it acknowledged the hardship doctrine in 
principle, the Conseil d’Etat did not allow for renegotiation of the contract by the parties 
themselves. 
It was only through the reform of French contract law enacted by the Ordonnance of 
10 February 2016 that the Canal de Craponne judgement was reversed by the French 
legislature. Realizing that France was lagging behind the general development in that 
area in Europe,227 a new Art. 1195 was inserted into the French Civil Code dealing with 
the théorie de l’imprévision. That article provides as follows: 
If a change of circumstances that was unforeseeable at the time of the conclu-
sion of the contract renders performance excessively onerous for a party who 
had not accepted the risk of such a change, that party may ask the other con-
tracting party to renegotiate the contract. The first party must continue to per-
form his obligations during renegotiation. 
In the case of refusal or the failure of renegotiations, the parties may agree 
to terminate the contract from the date and on the conditions which they deter-
mine, or by a common agreement ask the court to set about its adaptation. In 
the absence of an agreement within a reasonable time, the court may, at the 
 
seq.; see also generally PÉDAMON & CHUAH, supra note 34, at 18.  
224 Abas, supra note 16, at 64. 
225 Conseil d’État [CE] [highest administrative court], Compagnie générale d’éclairage de Bordeaux, 
Mar. 30, 1916, Rec. Lebon 125. In the case, a company had received a public permit to provide the city 
of Bordeaux with gas produced from coal, provide that the gas price would not go beyond a certain limit; 
due to disruptions caused by WW I, the cost for the coal quintupled and the maximum price agreed in 
the contract could not cover the company’s costs; the court ordered the company to continue the gas 
deliveries but required the state to pay a contribution (“indemnité d’imprévision”) to the company’s in-
creased costs.  
226 Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 79-105 DC, July 25, 1979, Rec. 33: 
“[L]a continuité du service public qui, tout comme le 16:26 13.06.2019 droit de grève, a le caractère d’un 
principe de valeur constitutionnelle . . .”. 
227 See the legislative report to the President of the French Republic of February 11, 2016, 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000032004539&categorieLien=id 
(accessed April 20, 2020).  
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request of a party, revise the contract or put an end to it, from a date and 
subject to such conditions as it shall determine.228 
It follows from the wording of Subsection 1 that the new French provision is still only 
concerned with excessive onerousness (“l’imprévision”) as opposed to the wider ap-
proach of “foundations of the contract” or similar formulas of the hardship doctrine, 
which are present in some other civil law legal systems like Germany or the Nether-
lands.229 Excessive onerousness means more than a mere increase in the costs of 
performance, which must be expected by parties to long-term contracts. Rather, one 
party must be confronted with an extreme, extraordinary, not-to-be-expected rise in 
performance costs or an extreme decrease of the benefits it expected to derive from 
the other side’s counter-performance.230 However, even under these circumstances, 
Art. 1195 of the French Civil Code cannot be invoked if the aggrieved party has ac-
cepted the risk, e.g. by means of a specific contract provision or by entering into a 
highly speculative contract.231 It cannot be assumed that the factual or legal effects of 
the COVID-19 pandemic has been accepted by the parties to a commercial contract, 
which is why, in addition to constituting a force majeure event,232 it qualifies as a hard-
ship event under Art. 1195.233 
The French courts are now mandated to adapt the contract if the parties’ good faith 
attempts to renegotiate have failed and if, in light of this failure, one party requests the 
court to do so. This new judicial authority has been characterized as “astonishing” and 
“innovative”.234 In light of the fact that even for administrative contracts, the French 
courts followed a rather restrictive approach for many decades,235 it remains to be seen 
whether and to what extent French courts will in fact make use of their newly granted 
wide judicial discretion under Subsection 2 (“[T]he court may . . .”) in order to adapt the 
parties’ contract.236 Given that the French courts have historically taken a restrictive 
 
228 Official translation available at: http://www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/THE-LAW-OF-CONTRACT-
2-5-16.pdf (accessed April 20, 2020). 
229 Fontaine, supra note 58, at 30. 
230 Accaoui Lorfing, supra note 66, at 452 et seq. 
231 Id. at 453. 
232 See supra Section 4.1. 
233 Heinich, supra note 13, at 614. 
234 Id. at 458. 
235 L. Thibierge, supra note 220, at para. 338. 
236 See Philippe Stoffel-Munck, L'imprévision et la réforme des effets du contrat, REVUE DES CONTRATS 
N°112Z5 30 (2016) who argues that French judges, at least in the first years after the reform, will opt for 
contract termination rather than contract adaptation because they are more familiar with that concept. 
This, however, would always require a corresponding request for relief from a party. 
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view on the renegotiation or adaption of contracts, it may be that in practice the courts 
feel inclined to refer the renegotiation process back into the hands of the parties as 
opposed to modifying the terms of the contract themselves. This would not only serve 
to strengthen party autonomy; it would also reduce judicial intervention to a bare min-
imum under the new law.237 In many cases, however, the French courts will not be able 
to exercise their powers under Art. 1195 because commercial parties very often ex-
clude the application of that provision in their contracts.238 
5.2.2. Germany: The broad approach (“disturbance of the foundation of 
the transaction”) 
In Germany, the clausula principle had been expressly rejected by the drafters of the 
Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) of 1900 as leading to legal insecurity and 
undermining contractual compliance by the parties.239 In line with the general view held 
in nineteenth-century legal science,240 the Canon law doctrine of changed circum-
stances was regarded as being incompatible with the will theory.241 The will theory 
prohibited reading an implied condition (“tacita conditio”) as to the continuing existence 
of the initial circumstances – a theory that had been developed by the Italian scholars 
Bartolus and Baldus in the Middle Ages242 – into a contract that had been deliberately 
entered into by the parties without specifying the specific reasons or circumstances 
underlying the original bargain in the contract.243 Traces of that idea can still be found 
in Austrian law, where the clausula principle is based on Section 901 of the Austrian 
Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, ABGB). That section provides that 
if the parties have made their reason to contract or underlying purpose as a condition 
of their contractual bargain, that condition will be treated as any other legal condition.244 
 
237 Accaoui Lorfing, supra note 66, at 461. 
238 Heinich, supra note 13, at 614, emphasizing that such clauses have become typical clauses 
(„clause de style“) in commercial contracts governed by French law. 
239 See generally Lutzi, supra note 46, at 100 et seq.; BENNO MUGDAN, MOTIVE ZU DEM ENTWURFE EINES 
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES Vol. I, 249 (Guttentag 1888). 
240 See Zimmermann, supra note 30, at 581. 
241 Fried, supra note 32, at 63: “[O]ne may ask what it would even mean to give effect to ‘the will of the 
parties’ in a case where the parties had no convergent will on the matter at hand”. 
242 See supra p. 19. 
243 Mugdan, supra note 239, at 249 emphasizing that such a condition would have to be characterized 
as a mere motive of the parties that would have no impact on the legal validity of the contract; see also 
Otto Lenel, Die Lehre von der Voraussetzung (im Hinblick auf den Entwurf des bürgerlichen 
Gesetzbuches), 74 ACP 213, 216 (1889), who argued that accepting such a condition would have “sub-
stantial legal uncertainty” as an “inescapable consequence.” 
244 § 901 ABGB provides “If the parties declared the motive or the ultimate purpose of their approval 
expressly as a condition, the motivation or ultimate purpose is considered as any other condition. 
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The Austrian version of the doctrine of changed circumstances is based on that provi-
sion.  
In spite (or because) of the rejection by the drafters of the German Civil Code to incor-
porate the Canon law doctrine of changed circumstances into the Code, there was 
considerable theoretical debate on the subject among German scholars in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century.245 Even before the enactment of the BGB in 
1900, it was argued by the German scholar Windscheid in 1892 that if the Cannon law 
doctrine of changed circumstances is “thrown out by the door . . . it will always re-enter 
through the window”.246 That time of re-entry did in fact come with the dramatic hyper-
inflation that Germany experienced between 1914 – the beginning of World War I – 
and 1923 – the year when a new currency (“Rentenmark”) was introduced to stop the 
hyperinflation. That scenario caused much litigation before the German courts. In some 
of these cases, beginning with the first case in 1922, the Imperial Court of Justice 
(“Reichsgericht”) came to rely on the notion of “disappearance of the foundation of the 
transaction” (“Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage”).247 That theory had been developed 
by the well-known German scholar Oertmann some years earlier.248 It was essentially 
based on the principle of good faith enshrined in Section 242 of the BGB.249 Given 
there was no Canon law doctrine of changed circumstances in the BGB at the time, 
the German courts grounded the Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage doctrine in the prin-
ciple of good faith. The principle of good faith, having a moral component itself, is not 
dissimilar to the broader moral justification of the Canon law doctrine of changed cir-
cumstances. It thus provided a sound justification for bringing the morally grounded 
 
Furthermore, such declarations do not have an impact on the effectiveness of contracts for considera-
tion. . . .”, translation by PETER ANDREAS ESCHIG & ERIKA PIRCHER-ESCHIG, DAS ÖSTERREICHISCHE ABGB 
— THE AUSTRIAN CIVIL CODE (GERMAN - ENGLISH) (LexisNexis 2013). 
245 See the references to the studies of Endemann (1899), Dernburg (1899), Bindewald (1901) and Artur 
Kaufmann (1907) by Köbler, supra note 30, at 90.  
246 Bernhard Windscheid, Die Voraussetzung, 78 ACP 161, 197 (1892); BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, DIE 
LEHRE DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS VON DER VORAUSSETZUNG 1 et seq. (Buddeus 1850) 
247 Reichsgericht [RG] [Imperial Court], Feb. 3, 1922, 103 RGZ 328, 332. 
248 Paul Oertmann, Die Geschäftsgrundlage: Ein neuer Rechtsbegriff (Deichert 1921); see also Eugen 
Locher, Geschäftsgrundlage und Geschäftszweck, 121 AcP 1, 71 (1923); Denis Philippe, Changement 
de circonstances et bouleversement de l'économie contractuelle 227 et seq. (Bruylant 1986). 
249 See generally Fried, supra note , at 74: “These doctrines (of good faith, unconscionability and duress] 
explicitly authorize courts in the name of fairness to revise contractual arrangements or to overturn them 
altogether”; REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, BREACH OF CONTRACT AND REMEDIES UNDER THE NEW GERMAN LAW 
OF OBLIGATIONS 13 (Centro di studi e ricerche di diritto comparato e straniero 2002): “The rules on 
change of circumstances have, under the old law, been worked out and generally recognized under the 
auspices of the general good faith rule of § 242 BGB and they have thus constituted one of the most 
famous examples of a judge-made legal doctrine”. 
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doctrine of changed circumstances into the German legal system. As Windscheid had 
predicted, the hardship doctrine in Germany did end up coming in “through the win-
dow”, i.e. not through the incorporation of the clausula principle into the Code, but 
through the moral grounding of good faith. 
The German hardship doctrine, as developed exclusively in the case law initially, was 
morally grounded but it also featured another component of the Canon law doctrine of 
changed circumstances: the implied condition. Pursuant to the Wegfall der Ges-
chäftsgrundlage doctrine, every contract is based on general grounds agreed upon 
between the parties, even if not spelled out specifically. These implied conditions con-
cern the maintenance of the general grounds upon which the contractual relationship 
is based; and, if fundamentally altered, would allow termination or modification of the 
contract. According to the German hardship doctrine, termination or modification of the 
contract would cover situations, like the COVID-19 scenario,250 where – without the 
fault of either party – the foundation or reason upon which the agreement is based 
disappears; but will also cover situations where there is an alteration of the equilibrium 
between the parties’ respective obligations, or where there is mistake by the parties 
regarding what circumstances were essential to the formation of the parties’ agreement 
(provided both parties were aware of them).  
Up until the year 2002, the doctrine of changed circumstance in Germany could only 
be found in the case law of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), 
which followed the earlier case law of the Imperial Court of Justice.251 However, in the 
course of a substantial reform of the general contract law in the German Civil Code in 
2002, a new Section 313 was introduced into the BGB, which, under the title “disturb-
ance of the foundation of the transaction” (“Störung der Geschäftsgrundlage”), which 
codified the existing case law: 
1. If circumstances, which became the basis of a contract, have significantly 
changed since the contract was entered into and if the parties would not have 
entered into the contract or would have entered into it with different contents if 
they had foreseen this change, adaptation of the contract may be demanded 
 
250 Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1021; Wagner, et al., supra note 69, at 846. 
251 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Feb. 15, 1951, 1 BGHZ 170, 176; BGH, April 4, 
1951, 1 BGHZ 334; BGH, May 23, 1951, 2 BGHZ 176, 183: BGH, June 6, 1951, 2 BGHZ 379, 383; see 
also the case law of the highest court for the British Zone in Germany: OGHBrZ, Mar. 31, 1949, 1 OGHZ 
386, 395; OGHBrZ, July 7, 1949, 2 OGHZ 202, 208; OGHBrZ, Mar. 30, 1950, 3 OGHZ 343, 345; 
OGHBrZ, June 23, 1950, 4 OGHZ 91, 96; OGHBrZ, July 13, 1950, 4 OGHZ 165, 172. 
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to the extent that, taking account of all the circumstances of the specific case, 
in particular the contractual or statutory distribution of risks, one of the parties 
cannot reasonably be expected to uphold the contract without alteration. 
2. It is equivalent to a change of circumstances if material conceptions that 
have become the basis of the contract are found to be incorrect. 
3. If adaptation of the contract is not possible or one party cannot reasonably 
be expected to accept it, the disadvantaged party may withdraw from the con-
tract. In the case of a contract with continuing obligations, the right to terminate 
takes the place of the right to withdraw.252 
It is noteworthy that the provision is not limited to cases of economic onerousness that 
occur after contract conclusion (Subsection 1). In line with Oertmann’s broad approach 
and the case law of the German courts, Subsection 2 of Section 313 equates the initial 
absence of “material conceptions [of the parties] that have become the basis of the 
contract” with the subsequent change of initial circumstances. This scenario relates to 
common mistakes of the parties or initial conceptions of one side which were not re-
jected by the other party when the contract was negotiated and concluded and have 
thus become part of the basis of their transaction.253  
German law is also very adaptation-friendly. If the prerequisites of Subsection 1 or 2 
are met and there is a reasonable adaptation option, the aggrieved party may demand 
adaptation from the other side.254 This adaption-friendliness of the German law be-
comes particularly relevant in the COVID-19 context, because, due to its war-like char-
acter, the risks resulting from such a crisis shall not be carried by one party alone.255 
The mere fact that no agreement can be reached with the other side is no bar to ad-
aptation.256 In that case, the aggrieved party may pursue its adaptation claim before 
the competent court. The aggrieved party is entitled to withdraw from or to terminate 
the contract due to the changed circumstances only if contract adaptation turns out to 
be illegal, impracticable or unreasonable for the other side .257  
 
252 Translation from the German original available here: https://www.gesetze-im-inter-
net.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html#p1146 (accessed April 20, 2020); see generally Lutzi, supra 
note 46, at 104 et seq.  
253 BGH, Nov. 8, 2001, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2002, 292.  
254 Norbert Horn, Neuverhandlungspflicht, 181 ACP 255 (1981); Norbert Horn, Vertragsbindung unter 
veränderten Umständen: Zur Wirksamkeit von Anpassungsregelungen in langfristigen Verträgen, NJW 
1985, 1118.  
255 Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1021  
256 Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Sept. 30, 2011, NJW 2012, 373.  
257 Christian Grüneberg, in PALANDT: BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH at § 313, para. 42 (C.H. Beck 2019). 
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Not surprisingly, the liberal nature and broad scope of Section 313 of the German Civil 
Code has led to the revival of the criticism of the early days of the BGB.258 It is argued 
that this broad scope can lead the parties into the “constant temptation”259 to escape 
their contractual commitments by reference to Section 313. There is thus widespread 
consensus in German legal doctrine that the codification has not changed the subsid-
iary and exceptional nature of the hardship excuse. Accordingly, the application of 
Section 313, like its case law-developed predecessor (the Wegfall der Ges-
chäftsgrundlage doctrine), remains tied to the principle of good faith. This time, how-
ever, not with respect to its moral foundation, but with respect to the need for a similarly 
restrictive approach in the interest of legal certainty and the upholding of contractual 
commitments. To that end, Section 313 shall be applied “with the same [high] degree 
of care as the principle of good faith”.260 
Jurisdictions influenced by the German doctrine of Wegfall der Geschäftsgrundlage 
include the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland), as well 
as Japan, Greece, Argentina and Brazil.261 However, the picture is diverse as to the 
courts’ powers to intervene and adapt the contract in these countries.262 Some juris-
dictions allow for contract termination as the sole remedy. That result is not in line with 
the idea prevailing in international contracting practice that a solution should always 
be found that avoids the premature termination of the contract by one side, thus making 
the avoidance of the contract a remedy of last resort.263  
 
258 See supra p. 35; see WOLFGANG HAU, VERTRAGSANPASSUNG UND ANPASSUNGSVERTRAG 250 (Mohr 
Siebeck 2003); THOMAS LOBINGER, DIE GRENZEN RECHTSGESCHÄFTLICHER LEISTUNGSPFLICHTEN: 
ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZUR KORREKTURBEDÜRFTIGKEIT DER §§ 275, 311A, 313 BGB N.F 245 (Mohr Siebeck 
2004); Ulrich Huber, Das geplante Recht der Leistungstörungen, in Zivilrechtswissenschaft und 
Schuldrechtsreform: Zum Diskussionsentwurf eines Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetzes des 
Bundesministeriums der Justiz 31 (Wolfgang Ernst & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., Mohr Siebeck 2001). 
259 WERNER FLUME, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BGB Vol. II, § 26.7 (Springer 3rd ed. 1979). 
260 Thomas Finkenauer, in MÜNCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH Vol. III [§§ 311-
432], § 313 paras. 5 and 52 (Wolfgang Krüger ed., C.H. Beck 8th ed. 2019); DIETER MEDICUS & STEPHAN 
LORENZ, SCHULDRECHT I: ALLGEMEINER TEIL para. 561 (C.H. Beck 21st ed. 2015); Lars Böttcher, Erman 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch, Vol. I [§§ 1-761, AGG], § 313 para. 32 (Harm Peter Westermann, et al. eds., 
Dr. Otto Schmidt 15th ed. 2015); Arndt Teichmann, in SOERGEL BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH Vol. V [§§ 
311, 311a-c, 313, 314], at § 313 para. 30 (Beate Gsell ed., W. Kohlhammer 13th ed. 2014).  
261 See Lando & Beale, supra note 97, at 328. 
262 Pascale Accaoui Lorfing, Adaptation of Contracts by Arbitrators, in HARDSHIP AND FORCE MAJEURE IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 41, 43 (Fabio Bortolotti & Dorothy Ufot eds., ICC 2018).  
263 See for the principle of “ut res magis valeat quam pereat” as general principle of transnational contact 
law TransLex-Principle IV.5.3 and Commentary No. 2, www.trans-lex.org/925000 (accessed April 20, 
2020); Ad Hoc-Award of May 27, 1991, 17 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 11, 16 (1992), excerpts available at: 
www.trans-lex.org/260400 (accessed April 20, 2020). 
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5.3. Transnational contract law 
At the transnational level, it has often been argued that the hardship principle is far 
less elaborated, established and acknowledged than the force majeure doctrine and 
that it cannot yet be said that there is a definitive hardship doctrine in the transnational 
context. It is therefore argued that hardship, unlike force majeure, does not constitute 
a transnational legal principle which can be considered part of the so called “New Lex 
Mercatoria”.264 However, for a number of reasons, the restrictive view of English law 
(and most other common law jurisdictions) on hardship should be regarded as a “sin-
gular rule”, which should not prevent the recognition of hardship as a general contract 
principle.265 One core argument is that English law accepts the frustration doctrine,266 
which is very similar to the US impracticability doctrine (which like the frustration doc-
trine is a restrictive version of a hardship-type doctrine) and that therefore the alleged 
rejection of the impracticability doctrine under English law is in fact contradictory.267 
It is thus not surprising that the doctrine of changed circumstances was acknowledged 
as a general principle of law in Art. V of the Claims Settlement Declaration268 and in 
the case law of the Iran-US Claims Tribunal based on that Declaration.269 In addition, 
 
264 See, e.g., ICC Case No. 7110 of 1996, 10(2) ICC Int’l Ct. of Arb. Bull. 39, 54 et seq. (1999), stating 
that “the theory of changed circumstances does not form part of the widely recognized and generally 
accepted legal principles”; see generally for the doctrine of the New Lex Mercatoria ORSOLYA TOTH, THE 
LEX MERCATORIA IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Oxford University Press 2017); KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE 
CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE NEW LEX MERCATORIA 53 et seq. (Kluwer Law International 2nd ed. 2010). 
265 See, e.g., Fouchard, supra note 181, at 428: “[O]n pourrait aussi se demander si la clause rebus sic 
stantibus et ses conséquences en droit administratif français ne correspondent pas effectivement à un 
principe général du droit qu’il faudrait introduire dans ce genre de rapports internationaux”; Hans van 
Houtte, Changed Circumstances and Pacta Sunt Servanda, in TRANSNATIONAL RULES IN INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 105, 115 (Emmanuel Gaillard ed., ICC 1993); Horn, supra note 157, at 25: 
“This principle has found a modern important and clear expression in article 62 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties of 1968-69 which deals with ‘Fundamental Change of Circumstances’…. article 
62 is a strong argument for the existence of a general legal principle which might also be relevant to 
transnational contracts with or between private parties” (emphasis added). 
266 See supra section 4.2.2. 
267 Brunner, supra note 29, at 410. 
268 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the 
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 January 1981, 1 Iran-US CTR 9 (1983). 
269 Questech Inc. v. Iran, 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 107, 122 (1985), excerpts available at: 
https://www.trans-lex.org/231400122 (accessed April 20, 2020): “This concept of changed circum-
stances, also referred to as clausula rebus sic stantibus, has in its basic form been incorporated into so 
many legal systems that it may be regarded as a general principle of law . . . . While it might be argued 
that, in view of wider and narrower formulations of the clausula in different legal systems and of certain 
differences in its practical application it would not be easy to establish a common core of such a general 
principle of law, the consideration of changed circumstances in the present context is warranted by the 
express wording of Art. V of the Claims Settlement Declaration”; Rockwell International Systems Inc. v. 
Iran, 15 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 239, 243 (1990) (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.); SCHMITZ, supra note 163, at 181 et seq. 
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the UPICC, since its first edition of 1994, include a Section 2 of Chapter 6 (“Perfor-
mance”) entitled “Hardship”. Those provisions combines aspects of domestic laws and 
experience from international contract practice and thus reflects a transnational hard-
ship principle.270 Vice versa, the drafters of the new French provision explicitly 
acknowledged the influence of the UPICC provision.271 So did the Dutch legislature.272  
Endeavoring to strike the balance between sanctity of contracts (pacta principle) and 
changed circumstances (clausula principle), the UPICC make it clear that hardship 
situations must remain the rare exception and that the pacta principle will usually pre-
vail. In that regard, Art. 6.2.1 provides: 
Where the performance of a contract becomes more onerous for one of the 
parties, that party is nevertheless bound to perform its obligations subject to 
the following provisions on hardship.273  
This wording is in line with the domestic doctrine of changed circumstances in various 
countries.274 Likewise, international arbitral practice considers the clausula principle as 
“a dangerous exception to the principle of sanctity of contracts and whose application 
must be limited “to cases where compelling reasons justify it”.275  
 
270 Accaoui Lorfing, supra note 262, at 54 et seq. 
271 See Claude Witz, Störung des vertraglichen Gleichgewichts im neuen französischen Schuldrecht, in 
DIE REFORM DES FRANZÖSISCHEN VERTRAGSRECHTS EIN SCHRITT ZU MEHR EUROPÄISCHER KONVERGENZ? 
119, 135 (Florian Bien & Jean-Sébastien Borghetti eds., Mohr Siebeck 2016); Ancel, supra note 220, at 
para. 49; Stoffel-Munck, supra note 236. 
272 ICC Case No. 8468 of 1996, 24 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 162, 167 (1999). 
273 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, Art. 6.2.1 (UNIDROIT ed., 2017); 
see also Ewan McKendrick, in COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS (PICC) at Art. 6.2.1, para. 4 (Stefan Vogenauer ed., Oxford University Press 
2nd ed. 2015). 
274 See supra Section 5.2.2 for German law. 
275 ICC Case No. 1512 of 1971, 1 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 128, 129 (1976), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/201512 (accessed April 20, 2020): “The principle ‘Rebus sic stantibus’ is universally considered 
as being of strict and narrow interpretation, as a dangerous exception to the principle of sanctity of 
contracts. Whatever opinion or interpretation lawyers of different countries may have about the ‘concept’ 
of changed circumstances as an excuse for nonperformance, they will doubtless agree on the necessity 
to limit the application of the so-called ‘doctrine rebus sic stantibus’ (sometimes referred to as ‘frustra-
tion’, ‘force majeure’, ‘lmprévision’, and the like) to cases where compelling reasons justify it, having 
regard not only to the fundamental character of the changes, but also to the particular type of the contract 
involved, to the requirements of fairness and equity and to all circumstances of the case”; ICC Case No. 
8486 of 1996, 24 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 162, 167 (1999), excerpts available at: www.trans-lex.org/208486 
(accessed April 20, 2020): “Hence, the termination of a contract for unforeseen circumstances (‘hard-
ship’, ‘clausula rebus sic stantibus’) should be allowed only in truly exceptional cases”; see also ICC 
Award No. 9479, 12(2) ICC Int’l Ct. of Arb. Bull. 67, 70 (2001), excerpts available at: www.trans-
lex.org/209479 (accessed April 20, 2020); Yildirim, supra note 34, at 87. 
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As a consequence of this restrictive approach, the wording of the actual hardship pro-
vision in the UPICC reveals its narrow character. It is not concerned with the broad 
notion of the “foundation of the transaction” or similar concepts of domestic law, such 
as in Germany. Rather, its sole purpose is to restore the lost economic equilibrium of 
a valid contract whose continuing performance would threaten one side with an over-
whelming loss. Within the UPICC, hardship is defined in Art. 6.2.2, which provides: 
There is hardship where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the 
equilibrium of the contract either because the cost of a party’s performance 
has increased or because the value of the performance a party receives has 
diminished, and  
a. the events occur or become known to the disadvantaged party after the 
conclusion of the contract;  
b. the events could not reasonably have been taken into account by the 
disadvantaged party at the time of the conclusion of the contract;  
c. the events are beyond the control of the disadvantaged party; and  
d. the risk of the events was not assumed by the disadvantaged party.276 
This definition shows two things. First, the requirements of hardship are very similar to 
those of the force majeure doctrine:277 occurrence of an event, of whatever nature, 
after contract conclusion for which the obligor has not assumed the risk, unforeseea-
bility, unavoidability and the causing by the event of an economic disequilibrium in the 
contract.278 Second, this economic disequilibrium must be “fundamental”. The mere 
increase in cost of performance never suffices. The event must have placed an exces-
sive burden on the aggrieved party, rendering performance substantially more oner-
ous, whether due to a fundamental increase in costs or a diminished value of the per-
formance of the other side. Whether there is such a fundamental economic imbalance 
cannot be determined with respect to abstract figures like an increase in costs of 100 
or 200 percent as compared to the initial contractual cost calculations.279 That question 
can only be answered against the circumstances of each individual case, including the 
nature of the contract, its subject matter and the conditions of the market in which that 
 
276 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, Art. 6.2.2 (UNIDROIT ed., 2017). 
277 See supra Section 4.3. 
278 See Art. 2 2020 ICC Hardship Clause, https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-
forcemajeure-hardship-clauses-march2020.pdf; Yildirim, supra note 34, at 86. 
279 The figure of 50% in the official Comment to Art. 6.2.2 UPICC was deleted in the 2004 edition; see 
Yildirim, supra note 34, at 100 et seq. 
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contract was concluded.280 The COVID-19 pandemic does qualify as an event causing 
a “fundamental” economic disequilibrium.281  
As to the legal effects of hardship, Art. 6.2.3 UPICC places the parties in the driver’s 
seat and entitles the aggrieved party to request renegotiation from the other side.282 
Only if these renegotiations have failed, either party may ask the court or arbitral tribu-
nal to terminate the contract or adapt it to the changed circumstances,283 whatever that 
court or tribunal deems more reasonable in a given case in the exercise of the wide 
discretion granted to it. If a court or arbitral tribunal is called upon to adapt the contract, 
it must take the nature and severity of the hardship event into account. In cases of 
such extraordinary occurrences like the COVID-19 pandemic, they must bear in mind 
that these events are so exceptional and extraneous to the contract that, absent a 
specific risk assumption in the contract, neither party shall bear the full risk emanating 
from such crisis, but that this risk must be shared by the parties.284 In these circum-
stances, the tribunal’s task is necessarily limited to “a fair distribution of the losses 
between the parties”.285 This follows from the general rule that the effect of the adap-
tation cannot be a “better deal” than the one initially concluded as a result of mutual 
concessions, accommodations and withdrawals of initial demands during the contract 
negotiations. This approach was adopted by the tribunals in the well-known AMI-
NOIL,286 Mobil Oil287 and Wintershall/Qatar288 arbitrations and in many ICC arbitral 
 
280 McKendrick, supra note 273, at Art. 6.2.2, para. 9. 
281 Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1021. 
282 See for the legal principles applicable to such renegotiations Klaus Peter Berger, Renegotiation and 
Adaption of International Investment Contracts: The Role of Contract Drafters and Arbitrators, 36 
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1347, 1363 et seq. (2003). 
283 See for arbitral tribunal’s powers to adapt contract and the required distinction between the proce-
dural authority of the tribunal to adapt the contract, the substantive legitimacy of adaption under the law 
applicable to the contract and the search for adaptation standards Klaus Peter Berger, Power of 
Arbitrators to Fill Gaps and Revise Contracts to Make Sense, in FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 269, at paras. 19-015 et seq. (Ian Fletcher, et al. eds., Sweet & Maxwell 
2001); the 2020 ICC Hardship Clause provides for three alternative legal consequences of hardship: 1) 
the aggrived party’s right to terminate the contract without adptation, 2) the parties’ right to ask the court 
or arbitral tribunal to adapt the contract with a view to restoring its equilibrium, or to terminate the con-
tract, as appropriate, or 3) the parties’ right to request the judge or arbitrator to declare the termination 
of the contract, https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-forcemajeure-hardship-clauses-
march2020.pdf. 
284 Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1021; see also Wagner, et al., supra note 69, at 848. 
285 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2016, Art. 6.2.3, Comment No. 7 
(UNIDROIT ed., 2017). 
286 The Government of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL), 9 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 
71 at paras. 24 and 59 (1984). 
287 Mobil Oil Iran v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3, 54 (1987). 
288 Wintershall AG et al. v. The Government of Qatar, 15 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 30 (1990). 
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awards.289 At the same time, arbitral tribunals must be wary of admitting unjustified 
attempts to renegotiate the contractual bargain under the guise of an accepted legal 
principle.290   
6. Conclusion 
Even though the force majeure and hardship doctrines both deal with the legal effect 
of unforeseen circumstances on contractual relationships, they took different paths in 
civil and common law jurisdictions, depending on the extent to which these jurisdictions 
were willing to admit exceptions to the pacta principle. In spite of these differences – 
or may be because of them – transnational business law has developed a unified ap-
proach towards both doctrines which is also reflected in the myriad of force majeure 
and hardship clauses to be found in international commercial contracts.  
The COVID-19 pandemic provides the biggest conceivable litmus test for the viability 
and maturity of these important doctrines in modern times, both on the domestic and 
the international level. While most scenarios caused by the pandemic will involve the 
force majeure doctrine and its domestic counterparts, cases will remain in which a 
modified performance is still possible and will thus be governed by the hardship doc-
trine or similar concepts of domestic law from which the transnational doctrine has 
emerged.  
The notions of unforeseeability and unavoidability, which are common requirements of 
both principles, must be judged against the background of the uniqueness and severity 
of the COVID-19 crisis. In spite of the numerous predictions of medical researchers 
and virologists during the past years, a disastrous scenario affecting the entire global 
economy like the “world virus crisis”291 caused by COVID-19 pandemic, could not have 
been foreseen even by the most diligent merchants. Nor could its consequences have 
been avoided by them. Ultimately, the strict requirements of both the force majeure 
and the hardship doctrines emphasize the accountability of parties to commercial con-
tracts for their own business affairs as a flip side of party autonomy and of the 
 
289 Crivellaro, La révision du contrat dans la pratique de l’arbitrage international, REV D ARB 69, at 79 et 
seq. (2017): “[T]he authority of arbitrators to revise contracts is certainly admitted in international com-
mercial law” (translation by the author).  
290 See supra Section 4 for similar considerations regarding the force majeure principle. 
291 Weller, et al., supra note 4, at 1020.  
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recognition of self-determination of the individual that goes along with it.292 In highly 
exceptional global scenarios such as the one caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, self-
accountability and self-determination of international businesspeople lose their princi-
pal justification and legitimacy. In such extraordinary times, the doctrines of force 
majeure and hardship assume the role of regular, rather than exceptional legal reme-
dies, allowing to distribute evenly between the players in the global economy the risks 
emanating from the unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic.  
 
292 See Flume, supra note 259, § 1.5: “Application of the principle of private autonomy means the recog-
nition of the ‘high-handedness’ of the individual in the creative design of its legal relationships” (transla-
tion by the authors). 
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